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Abstract 
Startups‟ contributions on economic growth have been widely realized. However, the 
funding gap is often a problem limiting startups‟ development. To some extent, VC can be a 
means to solve this problem. VC is one of the optimal financial intermediaries for startups. 
Two streams of VC studies are focused in this dissertation: the criteria used by venture 
capitalists to evaluate startups and the effect of VC on innovation.   
First, although many criteria have been analyzed, the empirical assessment of the effect of 
startup reputation on VC funding has not been investigated. However, reputation is usually 
positively related with firm performance, which may affect VC funding. By analyzing 
reputation from the generalized visibility dimension and the generalized favorability dimension 
using a sample of 200 startups founded from 1995 operating in the UK MNT sector, we show 
that both the two dimensions of reputation have positive influence on the likelihood of 
receiving VC funding. We also find that management team heterogeneity positively influence 
the likelihood of receiving VC funding.  
Second, studies investigating the effect of venture capital on innovation have frequently 
resorted to patent data. However, innovation is a process leading from invention to successful 
commercialization, and while patents capture the upstream side of innovative performance, 
they poorly describe its downstream one. By reflecting the introduction of new products or 
services trademarks can complete the picture, but empirical studies on trademarking in startups 
are rare. Analyzing a sample of 192 startups founded from 1996 operating in the UK MNT 
sector, we find that VC funding has positive effect on the propensity to register trademarks, as 
well as on the number and breadth of trademarks. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Objectives of the dissertation 
 
Startups are important in economic growth and development. New ventures especially 
technology-based ones are often associated with new technology applications, leading to 
increased innovation and competition within the market place and finally stimulation of 
industry evolution and increased economic growth; in addition, startups are associated with 
creating new job positions (Loveman & Sengenberger, 1991; Wong, Ho, & Autio, 2005). 
Even recently, the industry structure is shifting toward the formation of new ventures from 
established large incumbents (Carree & Thurik, 2010).  
However, startups face several problems in their early phases, which limit their ability to 
grow. There is a well known funding gap for such types of companies, although venture 
capital (VC) financing can be a means to solve this problem. There has been a wide literature 
on VC, such as the development of VC markets (Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Gompers, 1995), 
how VC funds operate (Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Timmons & Bygrave, 1986), what determine 
VC investment decisions (MacMillan, Siegel, & Subbanarasimha, 1985; Franke, Gruber, 
Harhoff, & Henkel, 2008; Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Petty & Gruber, 2011), which is the impact 
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for the performance of VC backed companies (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Bertoni, Croce, & 
D'Adda, 2010; Grilli & Murtinu, 2012), etc. In this dissertation we focus on two streams of 
this literature: first, the criteria used by venture capitalists to evaluate startups, and then the 
impact of VC funding on innovation. 
In fact, we are interested to assess whether and how the reputation that new ventures are 
able to create in the early phases of their development, help them in attracting VC funding. 
We also look at a specific instrument which might help new firms to construct their reputation 
in the market and protect their innovative outputs, namely registered trademarks. 
As concern the first contribution of this dissertation, even though scholars have listed 
many criteria used by venture capitalists to evaluate startups (MacMillan et al., 1985; Muzyka 
et al., 1996; Franke et al., 2006; Haeussler et al., 2008; Petty & Gruber, 2011; Hoenig & 
Henkel, 2012), to our knowledge there hasn‟t been a direct empirical assessment of the role 
played by a startup‟s reputation on facilitating the obtainment of VC funding. The criteria 
generally studied in the literature on venture capital funding can be grouped in two levels: 
generic criteria level and specific criteria level. Management team, financial returns, product 
offering (Franke, Gruber, Harhoff, & Henkel, 2008; Petty & Gruber, 2011), and alliances 
(Baum & Silverman, 2004) constitute the generic criteria emphasized by venture capitalists in 
their investment decisions. Moreover, when making decisions, venture capitalists also 
consider their own investment strategy on industry focus, geographic area, financing stage, 
and so on. In addition, studies further investigate some specific criteria deeply, for instance, 
management team characteristics, such as experience and background (Meyerinck, Oesch, & 
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Schmid, 2012).   
     Nevertheless, there are no empirical studies investigating the role of reputation on VC 
funding. In this dissertation we thus build on a more general stream of the literature on 
company reputation (Barnett, Jermier, & Lafferty, 2006; Caruana, 1997; Lange, Lee, & Dai, 
2011; Rindova, Ian, Antoaneta, & Sever, 2005; Zyglidopoulos, 2001), and use the following 
definition of reputation:  “reputation is characterized by a level of visibility with the 
organization, beliefs about what to expect from the organization in the future, and 
impressions about the organization‟s overall appeal” (Lange et al., 2011). As an important 
intangible asset, reputation has many merits making it a potential criteria used by venture 
capitalists. Startups with favorable reputation may be more likely to get access to other 
critical resources (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), to build strategic barrier for competitors 
(Deephouse, 2000), and to charge above average price on their products (Stephen, 2001). In a 
word, reputation is positively related to firms‟ future performance (Bergh, Ketchen, Boyd, & 
Bergh, 2010; Boyd, Bergh, & Ketchen, 2010). Suppose firm performance is one of the most 
important factors influencing VC funding, it is reasonable to believe that reputation may be 
an important criterion used by venture capitalists to screen their investment opportunities.  
In this dissertation, we study the role of reputation on the receipt of VC funding, 
considering two different dimensions of reputation: generalized visibility and generalized 
favorability. Generalized visibility is about the extent to which a startup is known by 
stakeholders and generalized favorability is about the extent to which a startup is given 
favorable judgments by stakeholders (Lange et al., 2011). In addition to that, we also take into 
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account the effect of top management team composition, which is particularly relevant for 
VC investment choices, according to previous literature for new ventures 
The first empirical study of the thesis thus address the above mentioned issues, using 
data from a sample of 200 new ventures founded from 1995 operating in the micro and 
nanotechnology sector in the United Kingdom through the period from each startup‟s 
founding year until December 31, 2010. In order to create measures for the different 
dimensions of reputation, we refer to previous studies referring to media coverage 
(Deephouse, 2000) for what concern the generalized visibility dimension and generalized 
favorability dimension. More specifically, generalized visibility is measured by the number 
of news in the media; and generalized favorability is measured by the coefficient of 
favorableness, which reflects the extent of how favorable a startup is and is calculated 
through differentiating news into favorable, unfavorable and neutral ones. Then the 
management team heterogeneity is proxied by team occupational background heterogeneity.  
As concern the second major contribution of the dissertation, we refer to the rich 
literature on the influence of VC funding on innovation (Bertoni et al., 2010; Bertoni & 
Tykvova, 2012; Engel & Keilbach, 2002; Hellmann & Puri, 2000; Kortum & Lerner, 1998; 
Peneder, 2010). The literature suggests that venture capitalists are active investors providing 
support for their portfolio companies and increasing their innovative output (Baum & 
Silverman, 2004; Bertoni et al., 2010). In this literature, most scholars have used measure 
based on patent data as a proxy for innovation outcomes, thus explicitly referring to a 
technical dimension of innovation. However, patent only reflects the invention stage of the 
 5 
 
innovation process, but do not capture in an adequate way the commercialization stage of 
innovation. Patented inventions, in fact, can generate returns only when they are 
commercialized into the market, and it is well known in the literature that many patents are 
not commercially exploited by companies or they are characterized by very limited economic 
value (Gambardella, Giuri, & Luzzi, 2007; Munari & Sobrero, 2011). A recent and growing 
stream of the literature has focused on trademarking in order to capture more directly the 
firms‟ ability to commercialize and promote new products or services into the market (Jensen 
& Webster, 2011; Rujas, 1999). Registered trademarks are a sign which serves to allow 
consumers to distinguish the goods or services of one firm from those of others. Previous 
studies have convincingly shown that new trademark filings is usually related with 
introduction of new products by companies (Mendonça, Pereira, & Godinho, 2004; Schmoch 
& Gauch, 2009), so that trademarking can be used as a complementary measure of innovation. 
As a second contribution of the thesis, we thus investigate the effect of VC funding on the 
trademarking activities of start-up companies. The objective is to assess whether the 
likelihood to file for trademarks and the trademarking intensity of new ventures increases 
after the receipt of VC funding, also in comparison to a control group of companies which 
were not funded by VC investors. Moreover, we are interested in assessing whether the 
receipt of VC funding has also an impact on the breadth of trademarks registered by a new 
company, as captured by the number of different NICE classes. 
In order to address the above mentioned research questions, we use a sample of 192 new 
ventures established from 1996 from the same sample of firms operated in the UK MNT 
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sector over the period from each startup‟s founding year until December 31, 2011, and collect 
data for trademarks from the UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO) and the Office for the 
Harmonization of Internal Markets (OHIM). The empirical results of our regression analyses 
indicate that VC funding is positively related with the likelihood of trademarking, the number 
of trademarks and the breadth of trademarks. Therefore, this suggests that venture capitalists‟ 
suggestions, involvement and commitment facilitate startups‟ innovation, and their tight 
monitoring stimulates startups‟ incentives toward innovative performance. VC funding is 
thus an important factor influencing innovative performance especially successful 
commercialization of innovations for startups. 
To sum up the contributions we intend to give to the existing literature on new ventures 
and venture capital funding, with the first empirical study about the role of reputation on VC 
funding we intend to provide three types of contributions. First, it is one of the first to 
investigate the relationship between reputation and VC funding. Previous studies analyzing 
the relationship between reputation and stakeholders are mainly about reputation and 
consumers, such as Caruana (1997) and Rindova et al. (2005); while the relationship between 
reputation and external investors is limited. Second, we investigate the effect of team 
heterogeneity on VC funding. There are some studies analyzing the effect of team 
heterogeneity on firm performance, such as Hambrick, Cho and Chen (1996), Jehn et al. 
(1999), and Giuri et al. (2010). However, the knowledge about the effect of team 
heterogeneity on VC funding is rare in the literature. Third, we measure two dimensions of 
reputation, providing a multidimensional perspective on reputation and stressing its 
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importance for a complete understanding on the VC investment decisions.  
The contributions of the second empirical study on the effects of VC funding on 
trademarking activities can be seen from two aspects. First, in our knowledge, our study is the 
first to focus on the trademarking activity of high-tech new ventures and tracing its link to VC 
funding. We thus contribute to a rapidly expanding literature on trademarking activity of 
companies (Greenhalgh & Longland, 2009; Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2012; Helmers & Rogers, 
2010; Millot, 2009; Sandner & Block, 2011), which has largely neglected so far the behavior 
of new ventures in this respect, but it has rather focused on large and established companies. 
Second, although this literature has mainly focuses on the characteristics of the industry (such 
as “high-tech” vs. “low-tech”) or on the characteristics of the company (such as company size, 
innovation intensity) to explain the propensity to trademark, we provide evidence that the 
financial sources used by a new venture, and in particular the recourse to VC funding, can be 
another important determinant of startups‟ trademarking activities.  
Except for the theoretical contributions, several anticipated managerial implications 
and policy implications could also be drawn from this dissertation. First, this dissertation 
has anticipated managerial implications for both startup entrepreneurs and VC managers. As 
for the anticipated managerial implications for startup entrepreneurs, we expect startup 
reputation is important in attracting VC funding and startup entrepreneurs should then take 
some actions in order to build favorable reputations. Given that reputation is 
multi-dimensional and the resources is limited in startups, startup entrepreneurs could resort 
to build favorable reputation in one dimension first and then build other dimensions of 
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favorable reputation gradually. Moreover, we expect VC funding has positive influence on 
startups‟ trademarking activities. If so, when choosing between VC funding and other 
financial resources, the contribution of VC funding on trademarking activities should be 
considered by startup entrepreneurs.  
As for the managerial implications for VC managers, if reputation is important, startup 
reputation should be another criterion they use to assess startups. In addition, to help 
startups in enhancing their trademarking activities, VC managers need to train their 
employees toward having strong capabilities in commercializing inventions.  
Second, this dissertation also has some anticipated policy implications for the 
government. Startup reputation is expected to have positive influence on their access to VC 
funding. VC funding is expected to help startups enhancing their trademarking activities. If 
so, the government need to make some policies help startups to build favorable reputation 
and help them attracting VC funding. For example, the government could create a platform 
facilitating the interactions between VC managers and startup entrepreneurs.  
 
1.2 Structure of the dissertation 
 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a brief literature review. 
We first explain why VC funding is an optimal financing intermediary for startups. Then we 
review the criteria used by venture capitalists to evaluate potential deals. Finally the effect of 
VC funding on innovation is briefly reviewed. Through literature review, we find that the role 
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of reputation as a criterion on VC funding has not been investigated, especially regarding the 
two general level dimensions of reputation (generalized visibility and generalized 
favorability), and there is no research analyzing the effect of VC funding on trademarking, 
rather than patenting, activities. Therefore, we intend to do two empirical studies on these two 
gaps based on a sample of startups in the UK micro and nanotechnology sector. 
Chapter 3 gives a brief presentation of the context of the dissertation, the micro and 
nanotechnology sector, especially for what concerns the case of the United Kingdom. Chapter 
4 is the first empirical study addressing the role of reputation on the access to VC funding. 
Chapter 5 is the second empirical study analyzing the effect of VC funding on trademarking 
activities. Finally, chapter 6 makes conclusions of both the two empirical studies (chapter 4 
and chapter 5). Limitations of our researches and directions on future studies are also 
discussed in chapter 6.  
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2 Literature review 
To investigate the role of reputation on the access to VC funding and the impact of VC 
funding on trademarking activities for startups, we consider two streams of VC funding 
literature in this dissertation: the criteria venture capitalists use to evaluate firms and the 
effect of VC funding on innovation. Therefore, this chapter gives a brief literature review on 
the two streams. We first introduce the characteristics of VC funding, why it is suited for 
startups, and then provide the criteria venture capitalists use to make investment decisions, 
and the impact of VC funding on startups‟ innovation.  
 
2.1 Venture capital funding: characteristics and impact 
 
Startups are generally subject to a liability of newness, a liability of smallness and greater 
variance of growth rates compared with established firms, thus with a lower likelihood of 
survival (Gilbert, McDougall, & Audretsch, 2006; Gruber, 2004), together with high 
uncertainty about the future prospects of young firms (Shane & Stuart, 2002), making the 
entrepreneurs facing with the task to signal the value of their firms when raising money 
(Higgins, Stephan, & Thursby, 2011).  
In addition, entrepreneurs also need signals to overcome the problem of asymmetric 
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information between themselves and potential investors so as to obtain financing: on the one 
hand, because of the unique characteristic of the knowledge that it is easy to be copied, the 
inventors are reluctant to disclose the fully information to potential investors; on the other 
hand, once obtaining the financing, the inventors may engage in opportunistic behavior, 
which leads to investors‟ reluctant to finance new ventures (Shane & Cable, 2002). 
 As one group of investors, venture capitalists have some specific advantages to 
alleviate the asymmetric information problem between startups and investors. Venture capital 
can be defined as “independently managed, dedicated capital focusing on equity or 
equity-linked investments in privately held, high-growth companies” (Hall & Lerner, 2009).  
This definition identifies some specific characteristics of venture capital investments, 
which make them particularly suited for new high-tech startups. First, their investments are 
mainly focused on early-stage firms and high-technology based industries (Gompers, 1995; 
Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984), since they are looking for investment opportunities characterized by 
significant growth prospects. Second, they provide capital in the form of equity making them 
share risks with portfolio firms and then have the incentives to help startups toward success 
(Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1990). Third, they are active investors, so that they not only 
provide capital, but also strategic advice and support which is especially important for 
technology based startups because they are short of these capabilities internally (Baum & 
Silverman, 2004). 
These specific characteristics make VC funds particularly suited to finance high-tech 
young companies, as compared to traditional investors such as banks. Banks usually lack the 
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necessary technical skills to evaluate projects (Gompers, 1995). In contrast, venture 
capitalists often possess relevant technical expertise needed to scrutinize the potential market 
value of the projects (Timmons & Bygrave, 1986). 
Moreover, from the perspective of startups, venture capital funding is more beneficial 
for their future growth. Because of regulations, banks normally can only provide debt 
financing. On the one hand, debt-based bank financing strictly restrain the cash flow of firms 
(Jeng & Wells, 2000). On the other hand, high interest payments are always related with debt 
financing, which may cause liquidity problems for startups and limit their growth finally 
(Gompers, 1995).  
Another source of financing is business angels, defined as wealthy individuals financing 
firms using their own funds. However, their investment scope is limited, due to limited 
individual wealth and limited number of wealthy individuals (Jeng & Wells, 2000). 
Compared with banks and business angels, on the one hand, venture capitalists‟ close 
interaction with startups may assist startups in improving managerial capabilities (Hellmann 
& Puri, 2000); on the other hand, as informed agents being able to pick up promising startups, 
the involvement of venture capitalists acts as a signal of startups‟ future success, which can 
enable startups to raise additional funds and obtain other resources. That is, venture capitalists 
act both as coach and as scout (Baum & Silverman, 2004). Projects financed by venture 
capitalists are characterized by higher returns, higher growth and larger size (Ueda, 2004). In 
conclusion, venture capital funding is the optimal source of funding for startups. 
There has been a large literature over the last 20 years analyzing the characteristics, 
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investment behavior and impact of VC firms. Some studies have focused on the diffusion of 
VC investments in a given country, looking at the institutional and economic characteristics 
facilitating their presence, such as in the US (Gompers & Lerner, 2001), in the UK 
(Whitehead, 2003), in China (Chang, Wang, Chen, & Fu, 2010), etc. Some studies have 
looked at the management of VC firms, such as their structure (Sahlman, 1990), the 
governance of their investments (such as staged investments, syndication of investments, etc) 
(Gompers, 1995), and their performance (Krishnan & Masulis, 2011), etc. Some studies have 
investigated the investment process (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Petty & 
Gruber, 2009) and the factors influencing VC decisions (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2011; 
Ebbers & Wijnberg, 2011; Haeussler, Harhoff, & Muller, 2008; Hsu, 2007; MacMillan, 
Siegel, & Subba Narasimha, 1985). Other studies have analyzed the impact of VC on 
innovation behavior (Bertoni & Tykvova, 2012; Kortum & Lerner, 1998; Moore & 
Wustenhagen, 2004; Penas & Da Rin, 2007) and firm growth (Baum & Silverman, 2004; 
Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003; Grilli & Murtinu, 2012; Peneder, 2010). In this chapter, we 
focus on two specific streams of the literature which are more directly linked to the 
contribution we provide in the following empirical chapters. Therefore, we first focus on the 
literature analyzing the criteria used by VC firms to select their investee companies and the 
determinants of VC funding. Then, we focus on the literature looking at the impact of VC 
funding on innovation outcomes of investee companies. 
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2.2 Criteria used by venture capitalists to make investment decisions 
 
There is a long tradition to study the criteria used by venture capitalists to make their 
investment decisions. A wide variety of evaluation criteria could be grouped into two 
categories: startup internal characteristics and startup external alliance.  
 
2.2.1 Criteria related with startup internal characteristics 
 
In early studies, the criteria used by venture capitalists are identified by sending simple 
questionnaires to venture capitalists and ask them to rank the importance of various criteria. 
Through this method, Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) identify five basic groups of criteria used by 
venture capitalists: market attractiveness, product differentiation, managerial capabilities, 
environmental threat resistance, and cash-out potential. Similarly, by analyzing the 
questionnaire finished by one hundred venture capitalists, MacMillan et al. (1985) emphasize 
the quality of entrepreneurs as the most important criteria used by venture capitalists. The 
study by Muzyka and Biriley (1996) is done by interviewing seventy three venture capitalists 
from countries across Europe and asking them to complete a questionnaire. The final analysis 
shows that the management team criteria is the most important factor, and product-market 
criteria only have a moderate impact on VC funding.  
However, this method is criticized on some points. First, this method only considers the 
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final decisions and does not consider the entire decision making process (Fried & Hisrich, 
1994). Second, it is based on an assumption that venture capitalists remember very well about 
their decision processes. However, venture capitalists only have limited insight of their 
decision processes and they tend to report those criteria which they believe are desirable 
(Petty & Gruber, 2011). In contrary, the experimental method could overcome many of these 
problems since it is based on real-time data.  
Fried and Hisrich (1994) use a case study methodology to address the problem of entire 
decision processes. They first propose fifteen generic criteria used by venture capitalists and 
explain the criteria based on three basic constructs: concept, management and returns. Then 
they develop a six-stage model of the decision making process: origination, venture capital 
firm-specific screen, generic screen, first-phase evaluation, second-phase evaluation, and 
closing. They emphasize that different activities are involved in each stage. For example, 
during the origination stage, venture capitalists emphasize the role of referrers; in the 
firm-specific screen stage, they require the proposals should be in line with their overall 
strategy in investment size, industries, geographic location and stage of financing; and then 
they evaluate the proposal according to the generic criteria; additional information is gathered 
from both company and outside sources by venture capitalists during the first-phase 
evaluation stage to determine whether the deal is serious interesting; in the second-phase 
evaluation stage, they begin to evaluate the obstacles of investment and how to overcome; 
finally, document negotiation is done in the closing stage.  
Further, Petty and Gruber (2011) overcome the post-hoc problem through longitudinal 
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data containing 11 years archival information on a European-based VC firm. Similar to Fried 
and Hisrich (1994), they emphasize that the criteria used by venture capitalists changes in 
different stages of the decision making process. In detail, product characteristics is the 
primary criteria during the first six months of the decision making process; and financial 
valuation and deal structure are the main reasons for rejection in the latter stages. In addition, 
they argue that except for the basic criteria emphasized by other researchers, including 
criteria related to the product/service offering, to the market/industry, to the startup team, and 
to the financial returns, there are other important sets of criteria used by venture capitalists, 
including VC portfolio composition and VC management time. In terms of VC portfolio 
composition, venture capitalists require the proposals to meet their firm-specific criteria on 
product focus, geography and financing stage. In terms of VC management time, venture 
capitalists sometimes reject proposals simply because they do not have enough time to devote 
to a potential deal.  
Except for these broad criteria on a general level, researchers also try to break them 
down into more specific factors over the last years and focus on criteria on a more specific 
level. Aggregate criteria are important to understand the overall evaluations investigated by 
venture capitalists. However, deeper insights can only be obtained from more specific 
analysis (Franke et al., 2008).  
Because startups are resource limited, a few signal tools can be used by startups to attract 
VC funding. Management team and patenting are the two most popular factors having been 
investigated in the literature on the access to VC funding for startups.  
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First, the question about what team characteristics are more important for venture 
capitalists is investigated in the literature. Findings by Franke et al. (2008) reveal that of the 
seven team characteristics (relevant industry experience, field of education, university degree, 
leadership experience, mutual acquaintance, age of team members, and prior job experience), 
industry experience, educational background, and leadership experience are the most 
important ones emphasized by venture capitalists. Further, they show that it is enough if only 
some of the team members possess industry experience or leadership experience. However, 
as for the educational background, heterogeneous teams are preferred. Similarly, Hsu (2007) 
also emphasizes the positive effect of prior founding experience, especially financially 
successful experience, on the likelihood of receiving VC funding. Rather than educational 
background, Hsu (2007) analyzes doctoral degree related with founding team and provides 
support on its positive influence on VC funding. Same with Franke et al. (2008), Meyerinck, 
Oesch and Schmid (2012) also emphasize the effect of industry experience. They find that 
firms‟ announcement of a new director with industry experience positively influences 
investors‟ reactions. Further, they find industry experience as an executive director is more 
valuable than industry experience as an employee or an outside director. They demonstrate 
that director industry experience is important because of the advisory role of directors on 
senior management.  
Moreover, Franke et al. (2006) propose that venture capitalists tend to provide 
investment to those firms having similar teams with themselves in terms of training and 
professional experience. Similarities in age, experience in leading teams and level of 
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academic education are not emphasized by venture capitalists.  
Second, the question about what dimensions of team are emphasized by different 
categories of venture capitalists are investigated. Franke et al. (2008) differentiate venture 
capitalists into novice venture capitalists and experienced venture capitalists according to 
their experience. They find both groups emphasize industry experience and field of education. 
However, experienced venture capitalists emphasize mutual acquaintance among team 
members (team cohesion), while novice venture capitalists focus more on tangible 
individual-level characteristics, for instance, university degree.  
Patenting is another important factor attracting VC funding in the literature. Patenting 
can be a credible signal because of the following reasons. First, it is costly for startups. The 
combined costs of direct monetary fees and indirect administrative costs associated with 
patenting process, such as understanding patenting rules and procedures, filing patent 
applications, defending the patents, are considerable for startups. Second, only those novel 
and practically useful inventions have the potential to be patented. Therefore, patenting is a 
good signal of firms‟ technological underlying quality and future market.  
Empirically, the positive relationship between patent and VC funding has been 
investigated by several scholars, for instance Baum and Silverman (2004), Cao and Hsu 
(2011), and Audretsch, Bonte and Mahagaonkar (2012). In a study of biotechnology startups 
in Canada, Baum and Silverman (2004) prove that startups with patents are likely to obtain 
more VC funding. Similar results are shown by Cao and Hsu (2011). They provide evidence 
that startups having patent activities (measured with dummy patent and prior patent counts) 
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significantly influence their access to VC funding. In detail, patent dummy and prior patent 
counts are both significantly and positively related with the total amount of VC funds and the 
incubation period. Audretsch, Bonte and Mahagaonkar (2012) also confirm the positive 
influence of patents in nascent ventures on obtaining equity finance.  
 
2.2.2 Criteria related with external alliance 
 
Some characteristics related with the presence of external alliances make it an important 
signal for startups in attracting VC funding. First, external alliance facilitates a startup‟s 
access to other valuable resources and knowledge. Second, it is a signal telling venture 
capitalists some other actors evaluate the startup positively (Baum & Silverman, 2004).  
Empirically, when investigating the effect of interfirm alliances on VC funding, Baum 
and Silverman (2004) propose to differentiate alliances into downstream, upstream, and 
horizontal alliances. They find that venture capitalists tend to invest more in startups with 
more downstream and horizontal alliances. According to their explanation, downstream 
alliances are associated with the access to complementary assets, like distribution channels, 
marketing expertise, and so on. All of these are necessary conditions for successful product 
development and commercialization. However, upstream alliances are related with the access 
to research know-how and technological expertise and they may make venture capitalists 
think that the startup is far from commercialization.  
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2.3 Impact of venture capital funding on innovation 
 
It is widely believed by both scholars and practitioners that VC funding provides a substantial 
contribution on firms‟ innovations (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Bertoni et al., 2010; Kortum & 
Lerner, 1998; Kortum & Lerner, 2000). If we adopt the definition of innovation as “the 
multi-stage process whereby organizations transform ideas into new/improved products, 
services or processes, in order to advance, compete and differentiate themselves successfully 
in their marketplace” (Baregheh, Rowley, & Sambrook, 2009), the contributions of VC on 
innovation should be seen from two aspects: on the one hand, VC funding is believed to drive 
investees‟ to have more inventions; on the other hand, once giving investment, venture 
capitalists are motivated to help startups in increasing the velocity at which new inventions 
are commercialized (Timmons & Bygrave, 1986).  
In the literature, the contributions of VC funding on startups‟ innovation is mainly 
related with the following reasons. First, venture capitalists could help startups in remedying 
their defects in limited funds and insufficient management experience. Startups are always 
financially constrained. The entry of VC funding thus provides them the opportunity to 
finance more inventions. In addition, due to their characteristic of newness, startups are 
usually weak in senior management, especially those from scientific environment, and 
venture capitalists could help them in this aspect, especially by providing some strategic 
suggestions. That is, there are some natural weaknesses limited startups‟ development and 
venture capitalists‟ entry could nicely offset these weaknesses and thus contribute to their 
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innovative outcomes (Bertoni et al., 2010).  
Second, venture capitalists‟ tight discipline may lead to startup‟ greater innovation 
performance (Bertoni et al., 2010). Once receiving VC funding, startups may pursue harmful 
strategies on venture capitalists due to their different goals (Gompers & Lerner, 2001b). To 
protect their investments from opportunistic activities by startups, venture capitalists are 
motivated to monitor startups actively through several mechanisms such as stage financing 
and taking seats on the board of directors (Gompers, 1995). The tight monitoring may 
influence startups‟ innovative performance.  
Third, venture capitalists‟ network is also beneficial for startups‟ innovative 
performance. VC backed startups are more easier to get access to other critical resources, 
such as potential customers and suppliers, additional funds, and reputational employees 
through venture capitalists‟ social network (Bertoni et al., 2010). As venture capital, 
additional funds make startups have the capability to finance more inventions. Reputational 
employees, especially reputational technological scientists, are important on making 
inventions. 
However, on the other hand, negative effects may also be related with VC funding. First, 
venture capitalists and startups may have different objectives and strategies and these 
differences may lead to disagreements between venture capitalists and startup directors, 
which finally absorb startups‟ attention on pursuit of new technologies. Second, to avoid the 
possibility that venture capitalists poach the inventions and then exploit them by themselves, 
startups may mainly put the investments in improving and commercializing existing 
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technologies rather than in pursuing new inventions (Bertoni et al., 2010).  
In the empirical studies, the inventions have been often reflected by the number of 
patents a firm has, such as Kortum and Lerner (2000), Lerner (2002), Bertoni, Croce and 
D‟Adda (2010), although there have been also studies looking at other measures of 
innovation such as the number of new products introduced into the market (Hellmann & Puri, 
2000; Peneder, 2010), R&D activities such as “make” or “buy” R&D activities (Penas & Da 
Rin, 2007), etc. The effect of VC funding on patenting can be summarized from two different 
study levels: the industry level and the firm level.  
At the industry level, there is a common sense that the fast growing of venture capital 
industry in the USA has spurred innovation. In the seminal work investigating the impact of 
VC funding on innovation using data across twenty industries over the period between 1965 
and 1992 in the USA, Kortum and Lerner (2000) provide evidence that VC funding does 
positively influence the number of patented innovations after controlling for R&D spending 
and the arrival of technological opportunities which could affect both VC funding and 
patenting.  
With a dramatic fall of venture capital activities in the USA around 2001, Lerner (2002) 
investigates the influence of the decline of VC activities on innovation. He argues that the 
impacts of VC on innovation are not uniform across the cycles of venture activity. He finds 
that impact is attenuated in the boom period and the dire predictions are overstated in the bust 
period.  
In addition to the study of the impact of VC on innovation in the industry level, some 
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researchers have discussed it from the firm level. In addition to analyze the impact of VC 
funding on innovation at the industry level, Kortum and Lerner (2000) also investigate the 
relationship at the firm level. More specifically, they find that compared with a dollar of 
traditional corporate R&D, a dollar of venture capital could be 10 times more effective in 
stimulating patenting. In this paper, they also realize that there is a causality issue between 
VC and patenting: the boom of patenting after receiving VC is not because of the stimulation 
role of VC on innovation, but because the motivation for firms to patent is to impress 
potential venture capitalists, or to avoid their innovations being copied by the venture 
capitalists. To disclose this relationship, they construct a sample of 122 venture-backed and 
408 non-venture-backed companies in Middlesex County, Massachusetts and then compare 
the quality of patents between the two subgroups. The results indicate that the quality of the 
patents (measured by patent forward citations and patent litigations) in venture-backed 
companies is higher. Putting the results in another way, VC does have a positive impact in 
stimulating firms‟ innovation activities.  
Bertoni, Croce and D‟ Adda (2010) also prove there is a positive relationship between 
VC funding and innovation. By considering a sample of 351 Italian new technology-based 
firms, they find VC funding spurs firms‟ subsequent patenting behavior. Using a sample of 
233 VC-backed firms and 91,381 controls in Spain, Arque-Castells (2012) find VC funding 
spurs subsequent patenting according to an inverted U-shape trajectory. They argue that 
before full development of products, more inventions are likely to be generated; but once the 
products are fully developed, the number of inventions generated should decrease because the 
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focus would shift from development to sales.  
However, in a study of young German firms, Engel and Keilbach find VC-backed firms 
display higher growth rates, but not innovative output, measured by patent applications. 
Similar results can be seen from an analysis of Austrian firms by Peneder (2010). Peneder 
(2010) first find that VC backed firms have better growth and innovation performance. 
Nevertheless, they further find that the higher innovation performance is because the firms 
selected by venture capitalists are more innovative than the others, not because VC funding 
causes firms more innovative. These two studies suggest that venture capitalists may assist 
their portfolio firms in commercialization, rather than further inventions (Engel & Keilbach, 
2002). That is, the second contribution of VC funding on innovation calls attention.  
Patent number, as is often used in the literature to measure innovation, captures the 
technological invention side of innovation. Since many patented inventions will never be 
converted into innovations and commercialized products, patents are considered only a 
reliable indicator for inventions, not for innovations (Millot, 2009). In contrast, trademark is 
more related with the commercialization side of innovation (Schmoch & Gauch, 2009). To 
complete the picture of the effect of VC funding on innovation, in Chapter 5 we will analyze 
VC‟s influence on startups‟ trademarking propensities. 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
About the criteria used by venture capitalists to evaluate startups, it can be seen that most 
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scholars focus their attention on management team, patenting and external alliances as 
important criteria used by venture capitalist in the literature. However, all these criteria are 
related with only one dimension of reputation: the attribute specific dimension of reputation. 
The investigation of the other two dimensions of reputation (generalized visibility and 
generalized favorability) on VC funding is rare in the literature. General reputation, as an 
important intangible asset, has many merits making it a good signal to indicate startups‟ 
underlying quality and future performance potential. For instance, thanks to the characteristic 
of hard imitation coming from its intangible nature and its accumulation from historical track, 
general reputation can be used as a means to construct sustainable competitiveness for 
startups, which is beneficial to bring more returns to venture capitalists. Thus, general 
reputation should influence the access to VC funding. This relationship will be studied in 
detail in Chapter 4. 
     As far as the effect of VC funding on innovation is considered, regardless of what level 
of analysis, most of the empirical studies have used patent data as a proxy for innovation. 
Nevertheless, innovation is a process leading from technological invention to 
commercialization of products in the market. In this sense, patents can only reflect the 
invention stage of innovation, but not the commercialization stage. Conversely, on the one 
hand, trademarks can be a partial indicator of invention, in the sense that usually the 
registration of new trademarks reflects the introduction of new products or services; on the 
other hand, they reflect the marketing capabilities of inventions (Jensen & Webster, 2011; 
Mendonça et al., 2004). Therefore, trademarks may be an alternative measure of innovation 
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and enable us to have an entire understanding of innovation.  
In addition, as several researchers have pointed out (Mendonça et al., 2004; Millot, 
2009), trademark data can be used as a good indicator empirically, because: first, trademarks 
have been recorded systematically for many years; second, the data is easy to get since all are 
in the electronic databases; third, huge number of trademarks are filed and it is good for 
statistical analysis; fourth, they are present in nearly all the sectors, including service sectors 
in which patents data is few; fifth, they are registered for one or several classes enabling 
researchers to do some comparisons among various sectors. Furthermore, they are supposed 
to be widely used by startups due to the reason that they are cheaper and take less time to be 
registered compared to patents, indicating that they are more capable of keeping pace with the 
market (Mendonça et al., 2004). Therefore, in this dissertation, we try to contribute to the 
literature by investigating the effect of VC funding on startups‟ trademarking activities. This 
will be studied in Chapter 5.  
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3 The context of the study: the micro and 
nanotechnology sector in the United Kingdom 
This chapter gives an introduction of the context used to investigate the research questions in 
this dissertation, namely the micro and nanotechnology (MNT) sector in the United Kingdom. 
We begin by defining what micro and nanotechnology is and its key characteristics. Section 2 
introduces the development of micro and nanotechnology in the United Kingdom. Section 3 
presents funding situation associated with MNT firms and innovation issues related with 
MNT firms are introduced in section 4. Finally section 5 in this chapter gives conclusions on 
why the MNT sector in the United Kingdom is an interesting setting to investigate our 
research questions.  
  
3.1 The micro and nanotechnology sector: key characteristics 
 
There is not a universally accepted definition of what nanotechnology is. We thus adopt a 
broad definition of nanotechnology as “the design, characterization, production, and 
application of structures, devices, and systems by controlled manipulation of size and shape 
at the nanometer scale (atomic, molecular, and macromolecular scale) that produces 
structures, devices, and systems with at least one novel/ superior characteristics or property” 
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(Bawa, Bawa, Maebius, Flynn, & Wei, 2005). It is a novel technological field, with the 
emergence in the 1980s. One key invention in this field is the invention of the scanning 
tunneling microscope in 1981 by Gerd Binnig and Heinrich Rohret at IBM Zurich Research 
Laboratory (Darby & Zucker, 2003). Then the discovery of fullerenes in 1985 makes a great 
contribution on the development of micro and nanotechnology. The commercial applications 
of nanotechnology began in the early 2000s. Also in the early 2000s it began to capture 
growing public awareness.   
The micro and nanotechnology can be used to a wide range of sectors ranging from 
consumer products through medical products to plastics and coatings and electronics 
products (Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportunities and uncertainties, 2004; UK 
Nanotechnologies Strategy: small technologies, great opportunities, 2010). It has been 
developed rapidly in both the research area and the application area over the world (Aitken, 
Chaudhry, Boxall, & Hull, 2006). The number of nanotechnology products or product lines 
on the market was increased from 210 in 2006 to 800 in 2010. The revenue of 
nanotechnology-based products is expected to grow from $2.3 billion in 2007 to $81 billion 
by 2015 in the global market (UK Nanotechnologies Strategy, 2010). Meanwhile, 
nanotechnology has the potential to change our everyday life as information and 
communication technology (UK Nanotechnologies Strategy, 2010). Even though this 
technology has been commercially accessible, it is in novel uses and the use of it is associated 
with sufficient tacit knowledge (Darby & Zucker, 2003), making owners of the technology 
have the potential to earn above-normal profits. It is one of the emerging technologies but at a 
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very early stage of development.  
In conclusion, micro and nanotechnology has experienced a pronounced development 
over the last years. It is a breakthrough discovery having the potential to drive technological 
process and change our future life. At the same time, the use of it is very imperfectly 
understood and is related with tacit knowledge. Therefore, few firms can successfully use 
them and the competition from imitators or sophisticated invent-arounders is not a serious 
problem, leading to high potential to earn above-normal returns (Linton & Walsh, 2004). 
Consequently, it is an attractive sector on venture capitalists.  
 
3.2 Micro and nanotechnology in the United Kingdom 
 
The micro and nanotechnology development in the UK is in an excellent position in the world. 
The number of nanotechnology companies in the UK is the third highest, after the US and 
Germany, and the number of nanotechnology patents in the UK is the fourth highest in the 
world, after the US, Japan, and Germany. The nanotechnology research in the UK is also 
well-known, with about 1,500 research scientists working on the development of 
nanotechnologies (UK Nanotechnologies Strategy: small technologies, great opportunities, 
2010).  
In the UK, the micro and nanotechnology companies are mainly related with the 
following sectors: coatings and inks, biotechnology, speciality chemicals, electronics, sensors, 
instrumentation, medical devices and drug delivery. The majority of them are small and 
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medium with respect to size (UK Nanotechnologies Strategy: small technologies, great 
opportunities, 2010). In terms of lifecycle in which a nanotechnology experiences: pioneers, 
startups, shake-out, mainstream, acquisition / mergers, consolidation, and obsolescence, 
nanotechnology is currently in a phase where majority of the active firms are starting up new 
ventures (Shah, 2004). 
The excellent position of micro and nanotechnology in the UK is highly related with the 
UK government commitment on micro and nanotechnology. The government commitment 
includes both fund support (which will be discussed in the next section of this chapter) and 
strategy and policy support.  
In June 2003, the UK government commissioned the Royal Society and the Royal 
Academy of Engineering to study developments in nanoscience and nanotechnologies and 
their impact. Consequently, in July 2004, the Royal Society and Royal Academy of 
Engineering jointly launched the report “Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportunities 
and uncertainties”, in which they recommended the Office of Science and Technology 
commission as an independent group to review what actions had been taken in 2-5 years‟ time. 
In response to the report, the Council for Science and Technology carried out a two-year 
review of the commitments set out by Government and launched the report “Nanosciences 
and Nanotechnologies: A Review of Government‟s Progress on its Policy Commitments” in 
March 2007. In this report, it shows that the UK is losing its leading position and falling 
behind in its engagement with this fast developing field. The main reason was explained as a 
lack of Government activity or funding in research into toxicology, health and environmental 
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effects of nanomaterials, even though Government had made progress on many of its 
commitments.  
Then in 2007, the UK government established the Technology Strategy Board, which 
then set up the Nanotechnology Knowledge Transfer Network (NanoKTN). The function of 
the NanoKTN is to promote and facilitate knowledge exchange, to support the growth of UK 
capabilities, to raise public awareness of nanotechnology, and to provide thought leadership 
and input to the UK policy and strategy. To achieve the goal, a series of actions have been 
taken. For example, it assisted the 23 UK MNT Capital facilities to develop capabilities and 
provide knowledge for those wishing to commercialize nanotechnology (Nanotechnology in 
the UK, 2008). 
In 2009, the UK government launched a strategy for nanotechnologies: UK 
Nanotechnologies Strategy: Small Technologies, Great Opportunities. The mission of the 
strategy is to support innovation and promotion of the use of the emerging and enabling 
technologies in a safe, responsible and sustainable way, and finally enable the UK‟s economy 
and consumers to benefit from the development of nanotechnologies. In order to reach the 
goal, the UK government has identified several actions outlined under four categories: 
business, industry and innovation; environmental, health, and safety (EHS) research; 
regulation; and the wider world.  
Firstly, the actions under the business, industry and innovation category mainly include 
establishing a Nanotechnologies Leadership Group, encouraging companies and academics 
to apply for funding through Grand Challenge calls from the Technology Strategy Board 
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(TSB) and research councils, and promoting national and international awareness of the UK 
nanotechnologies capability.  
Secondly, the actions under the EHS research strategy mainly include exploring 
approaches to Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) research on nanotechnologies by the 
Chief Scientific Adviser network, and government and publically funded research on many 
crucial EHS nanotechnologies issues such as the behavior of key nanomaterials in the gut 
when eaten and when inhaled into the lungs.  
Thirdly, the actions under the regulation strategy mainly include expanding the scope of 
the work on a scheme to succeed the pilot voluntary reporting scheme to include products as 
well as materials, monitoring the success of implementation of upcoming amendments to 
novel foods and cosmetics directives with respect to nanomaterials, and making the 
Medicines and Healthcare Product Regulatory Agency (MHRA) and the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) perform horizon scanning and monitoring in order to detect necessity for 
amendments to legislation in the future. 
Finally, the actions under the wider world strategy mainly include establishing the 
Nanotechnologies Collaboration Group to facilitate ongoing communication and 
collaboration between Government, academia, industry and other parties, and making 
information about Government‟s ongoing actions on nanotechnologies accessible to the 
public on a portal website.  
As with other instances of metamorphic progress, nanotechnology is concentrated in a 
few countries and a few regions in those countries (Darby &Zucker, 2003). MNT startups are 
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concentrated in six clusters in the UK: Cambridge, London, Oxford, Durham, Edinburgh, and 
Manchester. Cambridge Technopole is the largest MNT cluster in the UK. The key 
technology sectors in Cambridge Technopole include information technology, mobile 
telecommunications, biotechnology, electronics, instrumentation, nanotechnology, and inkjet 
printing. According to some publications, such as Time, Fortune, and wired, Cambridge 
Technopole is one of the world‟s leading high technology business clusters (Shah, 2004).  
In a word, the UK Government has realized the importance of nanotechnology and its 
potential on the future position of world economy. To support the development of 
nanotechnology, the UK government has made great commitments and the UK 
nanotechnology is in a good position in the world, especially in the Europe.  
 
3.3 Micro and nanotechnology and funding 
 
The funding invested in nanotechnology R&D in the developed world has accelerated rapidly. 
It was reported that the worldwide government spending had increased about seven-fold from 
$0.43 billion in 1997 to $3.0 billion in 2003. There were at least 35 countries had initiated 
R&D activities in nanosciences by 2003. Except for government funding, public and private 
funding on nanotechnology was estimated to amount to $4.0 billion in 2002. More than 100 
venture capital groups invested $0.5 to $1.0 billion into nanotechnology R&D projects in 
2002. Global authorities, especially in the USA, Japan and EU, have recognized the need to 
fund nanotechnology R& D to establish a leading position in nanotechnology and to finally 
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have a strong economic platform in the future (Waters, 2003).  
In the UK, according to a report by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in 2004, 
the government investment in micro and nanotechnology is in the second highest level in 
Europe, after Germany (Figure 1). In 2002, the DTI dedicated $48 million to nanotechnology 
on top of existing funding for subject-specific research councils (Waters, 2003). In July 2003, 
there was a cash injection of ￡90 million (124 million Euros) over a six period (2003-2008) 
by the Science and Innovation Minister Lord Sainsbury - ￡50 million for the applied 
research programme to support collaborative research and development projects and 
technology transfer initiatives, and ￡40 million for Capital Projects for a UK Micro and 
Nanotechnology Network (Munari & Toschi, 2011; Shah, 2004).  
 
Figure 1 Worldwide government investments in MNT Sector 
 
(Source: DTI Report 2004) 
 
 35 
 
In 2002 and 2003, the UK government support for nanotechnology research in 
universities increased significantly, especially the new University Innovation Centre in 
microsystems and nanotechnology at the universities of Newcastle and Durham and 
Interdisciplinary Research Collaborations (IRCs) based on the universities of Oxford and 
Cambridge. The IRCs was funded $30.5 million (Waters, 2003). 
Then from 2003 to 2008, Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) 
supported about ￡253 million for nanotechnology distributed over a portfolio of some 400 
projects. The main recipients can be seen in Table 1. Consistent with the support in 2002 and 
2003, the University of Oxford and the University of Cambridge received a high portion of 
the funding, following by University of Sheffield and Imperial College London.  
 
Table 1 Principal academic funding from EPSRC for nanotechnology (2008 data) 
Academic 
Institution 
Research 
Funding 
Academic 
Institution 
Research 
Funding 
University of Oxford ￡37 million University of Nottingham ￡10 million 
University of Cambridge ￡27 million University of Strathclyde ￡9 million 
University of Sheffield ￡21 million University of Glasgow ￡8 million 
Imperial College London ￡19 million University of Manchester ￡8 million 
University of Surrey ￡11 million University College London ￡8 million 
University of Birmingham ￡10 million University of Southampton ￡7.5 million 
(Source: Nanotechnology: a UK Industry View, 2010) 
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In total, from 1998 to 2010, an amount of approximately ￡642.60 million was 
supported for nanotechnology by the UK Government (Table 2). Table 2 also tells us an 
increase trend on nanotechnology support by the UK Government, reflecting its realization of 
the importance of nanotechnology and its commitment on promoting the development of 
nanotechnology.  
Table 2 Estimated Government support for nanotechnology 
Year Estimated amount  
2009/2010 ￡83.20 million 
2008/2009 ￡77.60 million 
2007/2008 ￡73.50 million 
2006/2007 ￡66.27 million 
2005/2006 ￡66.00 million 
2004/2005 ￡65.76 million 
2003/2004 ￡60.80 million 
2002/2003 ￡40.58 million 
2001/2002 ￡50.00 million 
2000/2001 ￡35.50 million 
1999/2000 ￡11.00 million 
1998/1999 ￡12.39 million 
Total ￡742.60 million 
(Source: Nanotechnology: a UK Industry View, 2010) 
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The investment by the venture capitalists on micro and nanotechnology startups was 
concentrated on certain startups in the UK. A similar trend is also present in the US. 
According to Lux Report in 2004, the top five nanotech startups funded by venture capitalists 
had raised 22% of total nanotech VC funding, about more than $246 million since 2001 (Shah, 
2004).  
Meanwhile, venture capitalists investing in MNT are also very concentrated. For 
example, there are about 9 venture capitalists in Cambridge that have funded MNT deals. In 
addition, many other venture capitalists have interests in MNT but have not made investments 
yet.  
 
3.4 Micro and nanotechnology and innovation 
 
“Nanotechnology has been a burgeoning area of science and engineering since at least 1990” 
(Darby &Zucker, 2003). The scientific and technological excellence of a technology can be 
seen from two indicators: publications and patents. There was on average one third articles 
per thousand on nanotechnology from 1981 to 1989, showing no difference from the mean of 
all science and engineering articles. Then since 1990, the nanotechnology articles have 
exceeded 2 percent of all science and engineering articles, exhibiting a remarkable growth. 
Except for the US, the nanotechnology articles were divided among the UK, Australia, 
France, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland (Darby &Zucker, 2003). In terms of patents, there 
were on average 33.3 patents granted per year during 1976 and 1986 (Darby &Zucker, 2003). 
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In the US, there were about 350 nano patents issued in 1998, while in 2001, three years later, 
the amount of nano patents issued increased to over 700 (Shah, 2004).  
As far as the UK is concerned, there is a strong R&D support from universities and 
institutions for the nanotechnology industry in the UK (Aitken et al., 2006). There are about 
55 non-commercial organizations undertaking nanotechnology-related R&D, including 
universities, spinoffs and private companies (Aitken et al., 2006). According to the 
Nanotechnology KTN database, there were over 60 academic groups engaged in 
nanotechnology in different levels in the UK in 2010. A SWOT analysis for the UK capability 
in nanotechnology shows that it has strong academic support, metrology and instrumentation 
expertise, and good track record of nanotechnology startups (Nanotechnology: a UK Industry 
View, 2010), indicating an excellent potential nanotechnology invention position and 
commercialization position of nanotechnology in the UK. However, the use of nanomaterials 
is not so developed in the UK with a few companies using nanoparticles in any significant 
quantities. Nevertheless, “this situation is likely to change rapidly” (Aitken et al., 2006).  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
MNT sector in the United Kingdom is an interesting context to study our research questions 
for several reasons. First, even though MNT is an emerging technology and is in its early 
stage of development, its commercial applications have been developed rapidly over the 
world. Moreover, few firms possess knowledge and capabilities to perfectly use it, making 
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them have the potential to earn above-normal returns (Linton & Walsh, 2004). Therefore, the 
MNT sector is an attracting sector for venture capitalists given that venture capitalists like to 
finance nascent high-technology based industries.  
Second, the MNT growth in the UK is in an excellent position, characterized by the third 
highest number of nanotechnology firms, the fourth highest number of nanotechnology 
patents, the strong nanotechnology R&D support from universities and institutions (UK 
Nanotechnologies Strategies: small technologies, great opportunities, 2010), and the good 
track record of nanotechnology startups (Nanotechnology: a UK Industry View, 2010). 
Moreover, the MNT sector has received widely supports from the UK government including 
both financial support and policy support. Therefore, the MNT sector, especially in the case 
of the United Kingdom is an interesting context.  
Third, this context has already been studied by other researchers, such as Linton and 
Walsh (2004), Munari and Toschi (2011), which can be an useful benchmark for our studies.  
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4 Does reputation facilitate the access to VC 
funding in startups? 
 
This chapter is the first empirical study, analyzing the effect of different dimensions of 
startups‟ reputation along with their management team heterogeneity on the access to VC 
funding. It starts with an introduction section and then section 2 provides a theoretical 
background. Section 3 discusses our hypotheses. Section 4 introduces the research context, 
data and method, and empirical results are in section 5. Section 6 presents conclusions and 
directions for future research.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As an important intangible asset, corporate reputation has received a lot of attention over the 
last years (Rindova, Williamson, & Petkova, 2010). Most of previous literature analyzing 
corporate reputation focused on established large firms; while the knowledge about 
reputation for startups is rather limited. Moreover, previous studies have primarily focused on 
the relationship between reputation and consumers (e.g., Caruana (1997) and Rindova et al. 
(2005), while the association between reputation and venture capitalists remains a relatively 
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unexplored topic (Hellmann & Puri, 2000).  
Reputation is especially important in markets with incomplete information such as the 
financial markets for innovative startups. The suppliers of financial capital have limited 
information on the demand because of the uncertain market prospects of new technologies 
and limited track record of startups‟ performance. However, finance is a fundamental input 
for startups, especially for technology-based startups. Compared with other financial 
intermediaries venture capitalists are more efficient in dealing with the typical problems 
arising from information asymmetry (adverse selection and moral hazard) (Hellmann & Puri, 
2000). Venture capitalists rely on various mechanisms to reduce information asymmetry such 
as screening, staged investment flows, involvement in the board of directors of the backed 
firms, and coaching. This chapter focuses in particular on signaling as a mechanism that 
reduces ex ante information asymmetry and adverse selection in early stage and seed capital 
financing. More precisely, we ask whether the startups‟ reputation affects the likelihood of 
receiving venture capital support beyond and above the effect of signals like patents and the 
composition of the management team that have been considered in the literature.  
Reputation is “…characterized by a level of visibility with the organization, beliefs 
about what to expect from the organization in the future, and impressions about the 
organization‟s generalized appeal” (Lange et al. 2011). There are three dimensions of 
reputation that have been considered in the literature: generalized visibility, generalized 
favorability and attribute-specific favorability (Barnett et al., 2006; Caruana, 1997; Lange et 
al., 2011). Generalized visibility emphasizes the extent to which a startup is known by 
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stakeholders. Generalized favorability indicates the extent to which a startup is given 
favorable judgments by stakeholders (Lange et al., 2011). Attribute-related reputation is 
stakeholder-specific, because different stakeholder groups may put their attention on different 
attributes. However, in the empirical studies, “all but a handful of the studies draw on one 
unidimensional aspect of organizational reputation, namely, being known for something 
[attribute-specific reputation] … the dimensions of generalized favorability and being known 
[generalized visibility] both have interesting but greatly understudied implications for 
organizational outcomes” (Lange et al., 2011). 
Moreover, different stakeholders may have different believes and opinions about the 
same organization which reflect their different social, economic and personal experiences 
(Gotsi & Wilson, 2001; Rindova et al., 2005; Zyglidopoulos, 2001). For example, investors 
care about different dimensions of reputation compared with consumers or at least assign 
different weights to the same aspect (Caruana, 1997; Helm, 2007). The investors‟ perspective 
is still not well known in the literature on firm reputation (Hellmann & Puri, 2000). 
This chapter examines the role of reputation along with other types of signals that may 
affect the probability to receive venture capital such as the composition of the management 
team and startup‟s patents. Reputation is measured with two dimensions of media coverage, 
generalized visibility and generalized favorability. Early studies have investigated the 
signaling value of startups‟ characteristics such as scientific publications and patents. The 
characteristics of the management team are the most important investment criteria used by 
venture capitalists (Franke et al., 2008; MacMillan et al., 1985; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). 
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However, to the best of our knowledge, no early study has addressed the association between 
venture capital and the diversity of the venture-capital backed firm‟s management team. 
Management team heterogeneity could benefit team productivity by facilitating mutual 
learning or by providing collaborative skills (Hamilton, Nickerson, & Owan, 2003).  
Our empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced panel data including 200 micro and 
nanotechnology startups founded from 1995 in the United Kingdom. The empirical results 
support the hypotheses that both the level of generalized visibility dimension and the level of 
generalized favorability dimension of reputation are positively and significantly associated 
with the access to VC funding. Moreover, management team heterogeneity has a positive 
effect on the likelihood of receiving VC funding.  
Our findings provide a threefold contribution to the literature. First, as commented by 
Lange, Lee and Dai (2011), research about the outcomes of reputation is still in its infancy 
and we provide novel evidence about the effect of reputation on VC funding. Second, while 
only few earlier studies have measured reputation along more than one dimension (Lange et 
al., 2011), we measure different dimensions of reputation - generalized visibility measured by 
total media coverage and generalized favorability measured by the coefficient of 
favorableness. Third, we analyze the effect of team heterogeneity on VC funding. While 
extensive scholars have analyzed the effect of team heterogeneity on firm performance (see 
for instance, Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Laursen, Mahnke, &Vejrup-Hansen, 2004; Giuri, 
Ploner, Rullani, & Torrisi, 2010), no study has been done on the relationship between team 
heterogeneity and VC funding.  
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The remainder of the section is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief literate 
review on reputation and venture capital funding. We outline the hypotheses in section 3 and 
then empirical design and data are described in section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical 
results and the final section gives a conclusion and limitations of this study.  
 
4.2 Background 
 
Information asymmetry hinders startups from receiving financing (Audretsch, Bonte, & 
Mahagaonkar, 2009; Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Leland & Pyle, 1977). This in turn may 
result in adverse selection, i.e. exclusion of good quality entrepreneurship projects from the 
financial market. In these conditions, patents, trademarks, customers and licensing portfolios 
and certifications assets are reputational signals that reduce uncertainty and moderate the 
adverse selection problem (Akerlof, 1970). Favorable reputation is often positively 
associated with past performance. For instance, Deephouse and Carter (2005) find that 
returns on assets affect the favorable media reputation using a sample of US commercial 
banks. On the other hand, Standifird (2001) find that supplier‟s reputation is an important 
factor determining the final bid price in eBay auctions. More generally, a favorable reputation 
can be beneficial for future superior profit outcomes over time (Roberts & Dowling, 2002). 
Therefore, there is a bidirectional link between reputation and performance.  
For our purposes here, a signal is any indicator of capability that can be manipulated by 
the actor and the signaling costs are inversely correlated with the actor‟s level of capability 
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(Spence, 1973). Reputation is a signal that a firm can produce through activities such as 
advertising and a better product quality. 
Many signals that are used by venture capitalists as evaluation criteria have been studied 
in the literature. For example, on a general level, signals have been studied in the literature 
include market attractiveness, product differentiation, managerial capabilities (management 
team), environmental threat resistance, and cash-out potential (MacMillan et al., 1985; 
Muzyka et al., 1996; Petty & Gruber, 2011; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). At a more specific level, 
signals include experience, university degree, age, mutual acquaintance of the management 
team (Franke et al., 2008), similarity between firms‟ management team and venture 
capitalists in terms of training and professional experience (Franke, Gruber, Harhoff, & 
Henkel, 2006), patenting (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Cao & Hsu, 2011; Haeussler et al., 
2008), firms‟ external alliances (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Hoenig & Henkel, 2012), and 
private equity placements (Janney & Folta, 2003). The management team experience can be 
further differentiated into team industry experience, prior job experience, leadership 
experience (Franke et al., 2008; Meyerinck et al., 2012), and prior founding experience 
(financially successful vs. unsuccessful experience) (Hsu, 2007).  
Even though there have been no studies investigating the influence of media coverage in 
the selection process of VC funding, there are at least two reasons to believe media coverage 
have important effect on VC funding: first, as a first, simple explanation, the media act as 
mirrors of reality reflecting startups‟ behaviors and performance that may reducing the 
information asymmetries between startups and venture capitalists; second, they also 
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influence or shape public opinions, beliefs, and attitudes toward startups (Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990; Deephouse, 2000) and finally affect startups‟ market competition (Ferrier, 1997). 
Given that venture capitalists are one group of the public, the media are also likely to 
influence their attitudes toward startups and finally influence their evaluation of startups.  
In addition, each of those signals have been studied in the literature can be categorized as 
attribute-specific reputational signals in that they can lead an organization to „being known 
for something‟ such as better product quality and market success that are relevant to its 
particular groups of stakeholders (Caruana, 1997; Lange et al., 2011). This dimension of 
reputation has received a great empirical attention because it is relatively simple to assess a 
particular organizational attribute or characteristic and associate specific attributes with 
performance indicators (Lange et al., 2011). The literature on organizational reputation has 
distinguished attributes-specific reputation from general visibility or prominence (being 
known) (Saxton, 1998) and generalized favorability (Gotsi & Wilson, 2001). These two 
dimensions of reputation are not associated with specific organizational characteristics; but 
instead they account for the generalized assessment of the organization which could arise 
from the combination of various attribute, experience and past performance. To our 
knowledge, previous studies have not considered these dimensions of reputation in the 
finance of startups. Attribute-specific dimension of reputation enables venture capitalists to 
have deeper insights on startups‟ specific attributes; while generalized visibility and 
generalized favorability dimensions of reputation enable them to understand the generalized 
potential of a startup. Our analysis tries to study the effect of the two general dimensions of 
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reputation. In line with Lange et al (2011), we believe that investigation of organizational 
reputation as a multidimensional phenomenon can improve our understanding of startup 
funding. 
 
4.3 Hypotheses 
4.3.1 Generalized visibility 
 
Sequential investment decision steps are organized by venture capitalists, such as deal 
origination, screening process, evaluation step, structure the deal and post-investment 
activities (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). Normally there is a large excess demand for venture 
capital funding which gives rise to a tough selection of proposals. About 80% of all proposals 
submitted to a VC firm are rejected in the initial stage of the evaluation process (Franke, 
Gruber, Harhoff & Henkel, 2008). Therefore, it is critical for startups to catch venture 
capitalists‟ first attention. A firm‟s media visibility reflects generalized awareness or 
prominence of the firm in the collective opinion (Carroll, 2004; Carroll & McCombx, 2003). 
Therefore, a higher level of media visibility makes startups more likely to capture the 
attention of venture capitalists.  
A higher level of media visibility also facilitates the access to startup information, and 
consequently reduces the level of uncertainty about the firm‟s potential value (Baker, Powell, 
& Weaver, 1998; Capriotti, 2009). By contrast, a limited media visibility increases investors‟ 
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monitoring costs, since firms with limited visibility are less exposed to the scrutiny of 
stakeholders. Therefore, visibility benefits venture capitalists by reducing their monitoring 
costs (Baker et al., 1998). 
Usually “stakeholders have limited capabilities to process information so they pick and 
choose media exposure (ME) data using combinations of automatic and „effortful‟ processes” 
(Wartick, 1992: 35). Although in the long run venture capitalists can rely on frequent contacts 
to have a better understanding about a startup, media visibility makes venture capitalists to 
have a quick impression on a startup in the short run. Media visibility then reduce initial 
informational barriers by providing venture capitalists with useful information about the 
firm‟s products or financial performance: “the newspapers present the companies to the 
public mainly as economic actors, as they give a lot more visibility to the companies‟ 
economic-financial issues and activities than their social issues and actions” (Capriotti, 2009: 
239). Therefore, we expect that the level of visibility is positively associated with the 
startup‟s possibility to receive VC funding. 
 
H1: The level of a generalized visibility is positively associated with the likelihood of 
receiving venture capital funding. 
 
4.3.2 Generalized favorability 
 
Generalized favorability is another dimension of reputation. Compared with generalized 
 49 
 
visibility, this dimension of reputation is based on the incidence of favorable news and 
therefore it offers a venture capitalist finer-grained information about a startup‟s quality. 
A generalized favorability is difficult for competitors to replicate and thus it represents a 
barrier to imitation. Reputation is rooted in a firms‟ history and unfolds over time through its 
products, services and strategy. Moreover, reputation builds upon interactions between a firm 
and its stakeholders and therefore it is the result of a combination of internal and external 
factors. The complexity of factors leading to favorable reputation gives rise to causal 
ambiguity and protects the firm‟s competitive advantage and future profitability from the 
threat of imitation. In addition, reputation is not tradable (Deephouse, 2000) and this 
contributes to the strategic value of this asset (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  
A favorable reputation affects the startup‟s performance and competitive advantage by 
facilitating access to other resources, such as talented people and other key inputs (Fombrun 
& Shanley, 1990). Talented people prefer to work in firms with a favorable reputation and 
sometimes they can trade off wages with the benefits of working in a firm that enjoys 
generalized favorability. These choices can be driven by intangible benefits such as prestige 
or status and more tangible benefits such as expected future wages and job security offered by 
a firm that is assessed favorably by stakeholders. In turn, talented people contribute to 
improve the firm‟s capabilities and profitability. For example, a study on eBay auctions 
shows that reputation is positively correlated with the price a seller could command (Stephen, 
2001). Reputation then affects potential performance by providing protection from imitation 
and attracting strategic resources. Realized performance in turn affects future reputation and 
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gives rise to a classical circle “favorable get more favorable and unfavorable get more 
unfavorable” (Boyd et al., 2010).  
From the discussion above it is clear that in a market where it is difficult to distinguish 
good entrepreneurial projects from „lemons‟, generalized favorable reputation provides a 
signal that venture capitalists can use before transaction to reduce uncertainty (Akerlof, 1970; 
Spence, 1973).  
 
H2: Generalized favorability is positively associated with the likelihood of receiving venture 
capital funding. 
 
4.3.3 Management team heterogeneity 
 
Besides reputation, measured by the attention that media pay to a startup, venture capitalists 
rely on other signals of quality and potential value such as patents and team composition.  
Venture capitalists rely on different criteria to evaluate start-ups ((Franke et al., 2008). 
Muzyka, Birley&Leleux (1996) identify thirty-five criteria used by venture capitalists in 
making investment decisions and find that the management team is the most important factor. 
The quality of the entrepreneur, proxied by experience and personality traits (such as 
capability of sustained intense effort, ability of evaluating and reacting to risk well, and so on), 
is also emphasized by MacMillan(1985). “There is no question that irrespective of the horse 
(product), horse race (market), or odds (financial criteria), it is the jockey (entrepreneur) who 
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fundamentally determines whether the venture capitalist will place a bet at all” (MacMillan et 
al., 1985). Similar results are also reported by Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), who find that 
managerial capability of entrepreneurs is a fundamental dimension that venture capitalists 
look at to evaluate potential deals.  
To our knowledge the literature on venture capital has not considered so far the 
composition of the management team, especially its heterogeneity. Team composition is a 
signal that may affect the supply of venture capital both directly (venture capitalists take their 
decision by observing the team composition) or indirectly (through the effect of team member 
composition on reputation). We do not consider this latter effect but treats only the direct 
effect of team composition on venture capital. 
Team composition has been explored in the literature, which has examined in particular 
the association between team heterogeneity and innovation. Heterogeneity among team 
members reduces groupthink problems arising from the search for conformity, 
inward-looking attitude and lack of exploration (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998). Team 
heterogeneity may also favor mutual learning (Hamilton et al., 2003). Moreover, diversified 
capabilities are difficult for competitors to learn and imitate (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; 
Galunic & Rodan, 1998). Therefore, a team with diversified characteristics is more attractive 
for the suppliers of financial resources (Bhide, 2000). 
Since the future performance of startups is one of the most important factor influencing 
venture capitalists‟ investment decisions, likely venture capitalists will be concerned about 
the heterogeneity of the startup‟s management team.  
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H3: Management team heterogeneity is positively associated with the likelihood of receiving 
venture capital funding. 
 
4.4 Research context, data and variables 
4.4.1 Research context: startups in the micro and nanotechnology 
sector in the UK 
 
We choose startups founded from 1995 operated in the micro and nanotechnology (MNT) 
sector in the United Kingdom to analyze the effect of reputation on the access to VC funding.   
First, investments made by venture capitalists are mainly focused on early-stage firms 
and high-technology based industries (Gompers, 1995). Moreover, venture capitalists prefer 
to invest in nascent technology industries rather than mature technology industries, since 
nascent technologies are more likely to represent the future of a market (Tyebjee & Bruno, 
1984). Micro and nanotechnology is a breakthrough discovery which may change our 
everyday life in the future as information and communication technology (UK 
Nanotechnologies Strategy, 2010). In addition, the use of micro and nanotechnology is not 
perfectly understood and the use of it is associated with tacit knowledge. Consequently, few 
firms have the capability to use them successfully and those few firms have fewer 
probabilities to confront serious competition from imitators, making the potential to earn 
above-normal returns greater (Linton & Walsh, 2004).  
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Second, due to their young age and limited resources to devote to building reputation, 
startups are less likely to achieve favorable reputation compared to established large firms. 
The effect of reputation for startups then is more valuable and its effect on VC funding is 
more interesting. Startups in micro and nanotechnology sector are especially interesting. 
Micro and nanotechnology has experienced a rapid growth in the research area over the world 
(Aitken et al., 2006). For instance, Linton and Walsh (2004) and Munari and Toschi (2011) 
have studied micro and nanotechnology sector. In the real world, nanotechnology related 
products and the revenues from nanotechnology-based products have been increased 
dramatically in the global market (UK Nanotechnologies strategy, 2010). The micro and 
nanotechnology is extremely important for the UK economy since the UK firms operated in 
nanotechnology area engage in each stage of the supply chain (Nanotechnology: a UK 
Industry View, 2010). Moreover, the number of nanotechnology related firms in the UK is the 
third highest, after the US and Germany. The UK has a good position in the micro and 
nanotechnology development (UK Nanotechnologies Strategy: small technologies, great 
opportunities, 2010). 
 
4.4.2 Data collection 
 
We use a hand-collected panel data in this chapter. First, according to the Industrial Map of 
UK MNT, in total, there were 372 companies operating in the MNT sector in the UK by 2004, 
among which an initial sample of 201 startups was identified. The industrial Map of UK 
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MNT was collected by the MNT Network and the Department of Trade and Industry in 2004. 
Startup basic information, including founding year, region, and corporate origin, are 
contained in the Industrial Map of UK MNT.  
Second, Companies House was used to check for name changes and status for the 
startups. Company name was used to obtain startups‟ other information. We obtained all the 
names a company used in history.  
Third, the VC funding information was gathered through Thomson One (formerly, 
VentureXpert). Except for VC funding information, we identified additional 9 VC-funded 
startups operating in the MNT sector from Thomson One.  
Fourth, media coverage was collected from LexisNexis Academic. Following the 
procedure adopted by Deephouse (2000) in measuring the media reputation, we first 
identified news in terms of favorable, unfavorable, and neutral. If there was more than one 
startup in an article, we coded them independently. By favorable, it means a startup is praised 
for its actions or involved in some events that may increase its reputation, for example, 
receiving award for their technologies. An unfavorable recording occurs when a startup is 
criticized for its actions or involved in some events that may decrease its reputation, like 
disappointing market competition of a technology, and then the startup was commented as 
“...enables researchers to do what was impossible before”. A neutral rating is coded when a 
startup is reported without any evaluations. Virtually, there are favorable, unfavorable and 
neutral news for each startup. 
Fifth, director information was collected by the following steps. Director list for each 
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startup was found from FAME. 10 startups could not be found from FAME. Since director 
heterogeneity is an important independent variable in this article, we excluded these 10 
startups from our sample. Information about directors in FAME includes current and previous 
list of directors with title, appointment date, resignation date and birthday for each director. 
Company Director Check was then used to collect information on each director‟s previous 
occupational experience background. Finally, directors‟ publication information was 
collected from Scopus. 
Finally, European patent applications and their forward citations for each company were 
collected from QPAT. Here, we decided to use patent application date, rather than grant date 
as the relevant date, because the application date has already reflected startups‟ possess of 
innovations.  
In short, the final sample includes 200 startups founded from 1995, including 69 
VC-funded and 131 non VC-funded startups. The final dataset is structured as an unbalanced 
panel data over the period from each startup‟s founding year until December 31, 2010. 
 
4.4.3 Variables 
(1) Measuring reputation 
 
There are two approaches in the literature to measure reputation: a direct approach and an 
indirect approach. A direct approach is to measure reputation itself through direct interviews 
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with key stakeholders. An indirect approach is to infer reputation from the perception or 
assessment of observable firm attributes or third-party actions (Rindova et al., 2005). Most 
researchers have used indirect approach to measure reputation, such as Fortune magazine‟s 
corporate reputation index and media coverage.  
Fortune magazine‟s Corporate Reputation Index is a widely used method to measure 
reputation (Bauer, 2010), which was used by more than one fifth of the 16 studies on 
reputation Lange et al. reviewed (Lange et al., 2011). The index is achieved by asking 
thousands of senior executive, outside directors, and financial analysts to rank the top 10 
companies in their industry based on 8 criteria (Highhouse, Broadfoot, Yugo, & Devendorf, 
2009a). However, this measurement can just apply to large firms, and is mostly linked with 
firms‟ previous financial performance, rarely about other aspects (Bauer, 2010; Brown & 
Perry, 1994a; Fryxell & Wang, 1994; Lange et al., 2011). Another criticism is that consumers, 
employees and other important stakeholders are not covered by the survey (Fryxell & Wang, 
1994).  
In addition to Fortune Magazine‟s “Most Admired Corporations”, there are also some 
other rankings, such as “Asia‟s Most Admired Companies” by Asia Business Magazine, 
“Review 200” by Far Eastern Economic Review, “Britain‟s Most Admired Companies” by 
Management Today, “Europe‟s Most Respected Companies” by Financial Times, and so on 
(Fombrun, 1998).  
Instead of using publication rankings, Deephouse (2000) adopts media reputation to 
depict organizational reputation. Rindova et al. (2007) also demonstrate that media coverage 
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could depict initial reputation accumulation process, since on the one hand, media, as a public 
agent, form their own opinions unobtrusively; on the other hand, as an influential audience, 
they influence others‟ opinions and perceptions. Fombrun and Shanley (1990) point out that 
firms with more positive news coverage are more likely to be in the list of Fortune Magazine's 
Most Admired Corporations. Further, the amount, tone and recency of media coverage 
significantly influence the change of corporate reputation in Fortune's Most Admired 
Corporations (Wartick, 1992). Previous articles have used media coverage most for 
established large firms, although some of them have referred also to startups. We will be one 
of the few to use it for startups. 
To our knowledge, the study by Rindova et al. (2005) is one of the few to measure 
reputation directly. The authors differentiate business school reputations into two dimensions: 
perceived quality and prominence. Then they measure these two dimensions directly. As for 
prominence, it is measured by the number of recruiters that nominated a given school. The 
average of recruiters‟ ratings of a school is used to measure perceived quality. 
Even though the direct approach can directly reflect venture capitalists‟ impressions 
and opinions toward a startup, given that it is difficult to ask venture capitalists to evaluate 
each firm over time we prefer to measure reputation indirectly as done by most scholars. For 
panel data, the direct approach is indeed based on a very strong or even practically impossible 
assumption that venture capitalists remember very well about each firm‟s previous 
performance in each year. As for the indirect way, we choose media coverage as done by 
other articles on startups to measure the generalized dimension of reputation, because on the 
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one hand, Fortune Magazine's reputation index is only about large firms; on the other hand, 
media coverage enables us to measure both the generalized visibility dimension (the total 
amount of media coverage a firm received) and the generalized favorability dimension (the 
coefficient of favorableness based on the favorable, neutral and unfavorable news a startup 
received) of reputation. In addition, media coverage has some advantages in terms of 
reputation reflection. First, media selects a firm to report from a huge number of firms, which 
makes media coverage an important potential signal of firms‟ underling quality. Second, as a 
public agent, the media form their opinions more objectively. Third, it avoids the main 
problem of the use of Fortune Magazine reputation index, namely, the financial halo effect.  
 
(2) Variables 
 
To explore the effect of reputation on the likelihood of receiving VC funding, the dependent 
variable involved here is a dummy variable, dumvcit which takes value 1 if startup i received 
VC funds in a given year and 0 otherwise.  
There are three independent variables involved in this paper. First, news is used to 
measure the level of generalized visibility dimension of reputation. News is the number of 
media coverage the focal startup received in a given year.  
Second, we use the coefficient of media favorableness as a proxy for generalized 
favorability dimension of reputation (Source: Deephouse (2000). The coefficient of 
favorableness is calculated as follows: 
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where “f” is the number of favorable news; “u” is the number of unfavorable news; “total” is 
the number of total news. The coefficient of media favorableness ranges from “-1” to “1”, 
with “-1” implying all unfavorable reputation and “1” all favorable reputation. 
Third, management team heterogeneity is concentrated on management team 
occupational background heterogeneity. Directors‟ occupational backgrounds reflect their 
professional orientation (Hambrick et al., 1996). A management team with diversified 
occupational backgrounds has the advantage to have comprehensive identifications and 
perceptions of startup problems, and can provide diverse solutions to these problems 
(Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay, & Zhao, 2009). Increasing occupational background diversity 
allows for better division of labor, exploitation of complementarities and cross-fertilization, 
which are good for creativity and productivity. Our measure of heterogeneity is based on the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index: 
heterogeneity = 1 − Σpi
2 
where p is the proportion of team members in each of the categories, and i is the number of 
different categories. The range of this variable is from 0 to (1-1/i). “0” means a totally 
homogeneous team. The closer the value is to (1-1/i), the more heterogeneous the team is. To 
calculate occupational experience heterogeneity, six groups of occupational background are 
first identified: accounting, general management, law, engineering, finance, and others. The 
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Herfindal-Hirschman index is then used to calculate the occupational experience 
heterogeneity.  
Finally, we also include some control variables which may affect the access to VC 
funding: 
Other management team characteristics- Team scientific capability is important for 
further upgrading of technologies and transferring basic technology into practical technology. 
It is expected there is a positive association between management team scientific capability 
and VC funding. Meandoctor and totalpublication are used to measure director‟s scientific 
capability. Meandoctor is calculated by the number of directors with a PhD degree divided by 
the total number of directors. Some directors are professors, but there is no information about 
whether they have a PhD degree or not. However, professors are supposed to have a PhD 
degree in the UK. We thus assume all professors have doctor degree. Totalpublication is the 
total amount of publications on all the directors for a startup in a given year.  
Innovation characteristics- venture capitalists like to finance start-ups with strong 
technologies (Baum & Silverman, 2004). Technology based startups with radical 
technologies have a greater  opportunity to survive (O'Shea, Chugh, & Allen, 2008). Patents 
are often used as a signal reflecting technology quality of a start-up so as to improve the 
chances of obtaining venture capital (Conti, Thursby, & Rothaermel, 2011). Hence, patent 
behavior, measured by a dummy variable dumpatent, is expected to positively influence the 
access to VC funding. Patent forward citations are often used to measure patent quality. 
Forward citations are citations about a patent made by other patents (Duguet & MacGarvie, 
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2005). Forward citations of a patent suggest recognition of its importance (Lanjouw & 
Schankerman, 2004). The variable averagecitation is also included in this section. It is the 
average patent forward citations for the focal startup in a given year.  
Startup type- Dumaso is a dummy variable with value 1 if a startup is an academic 
spinoff. Previous literature tells us that entrepreneurs of academic spinoffs are historically in 
academic environment, not in business environment, which may make them more difficult to 
attract VC funding. On the other hand, strong scientific skills by academic spinoff 
entrepreneurs extensively increase the possibility to have high quality technology, which is a 
critical factor considered by venture capitalists.  
Startup age- startup age is a startup‟s age since its founding year.  
Region dummy- 12 region dummies are used to control for the region effect on the access 
to VC funding. Northern Ireland is the base.  
All these variables are summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Definition of variables 
Variable 
type 
Name  definition source 
Dependent 
Variable 
Dumvcit Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for 
startup i received VC funding at year t  
Thomson 
One 
Independent 
variables 
news The number of news received by the focal 
startup at year t 
LexisNexis 
Coefficient of 
favorableness 
coefficient of favorablenes 
=
 
 
 
 
 
f 2 − fu
 total 2
 if f > 𝑢 
0            if f = u
fu − u2
 total 2
 𝑖𝑓 𝑢 > 𝑓
  
where “f” is the number of favorable news; 
“u” is the number of unfavorable news; and 
“total” is the number of news at year t. 
LexisNexis 
Background 
heterogeneity 
Group directors into six groups according to 
their occupational background: accounting, 
general management, law, engineering, 
finance, and others. The 
Herfindal-Hirschman index is then used to 
calculate background heterogeneity. 
FAME; 
Company 
Director 
Check 
Control 
variables 
meandoctor The number of directors with PhD degree 
divided by the total number of directors 
FAME 
Total 
publications 
Total number of publications on all the 
directors for the focal startup in a given year 
Scopus 
Dum patent Dummy with value 1 if the focal startup has 
at least one patent   
QPAT 
Average 
citations 
The total amount of forward citations 
received divided by the patent application 
stock 
QPAT 
Startup age Startup age at year t  MNT 
dumaso Dummy with value 1 if the focal startup is 
an academic spinoff 
MNT 
Region 
dummies 
A set of 12 region dummies MNT 
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive analysis 
 
Overall, 141 out of 200 (70.5%) startups have been reported at least once in the media. 
Among those VC backed startups, 89.96% (60 out of 69) startups have been reported at least 
once; while among those non VC backed startups, 61.83% (81 out of 131) startups have been 
reported in the media. Meanwhile, the p-value of the chi-square test is 0, indicating whether a 
startup is reported by the media is highly correlated with the likelihood of receiving VC 
funding. 
When considering the sequence of media coverage and first round VC funding, there are 
116 had media coverage first before receiving their first round VC funds; there are 20 
received their first VC funds first before having media coverage; and there are 11 received 
their first VC funds and media coverage at the same year. For those 69 VC-backed firms, 35 
reported by the media before receiving their first VC funds; 23 received their first VC funds 
before media coverage; and 11 received their first VC funds and were firstly reported by the 
media at the same year. These data tell us media coverage maybe has a positive influence on 
VC funding. 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables. It clearly shows that on 
average, each year VC funded startups have higher number of media coverage, higher 
coefficient of favorableness, and higher team occupational background heterogeneity than 
non VC funded startups (1.6 vs. 0.72, 0.15 vs. 0.09, and 0.4 vs. 0.32 respectively). Moreover, 
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the T-test p values also indicate that the average values about the number of news, the 
coefficient of favorableness and the team occupational background heterogeneity are all 
statistically different between the two groups: VC funded startups and non VC funded 
startups. The descriptive analyses results also show that the mean value of the coefficient of 
favorableness is positive for both the two groups, indicating favorable news dominate 
unfavorable news in the media regarding technology based startups.  
VC funded startups are also related with higher likelihood of patenting and have higher 
average patent forward citations than non VC funded startups, indicating startups with great 
innovations have higher possibility to receive VC funding. Moreover, directors in VC funded 
startups have more scientific publications as compared to directors in non VC funded startups. 
However, the differences between the two groups are not so significant with respect to 
meandoctor. Both the two groups, on average, have 0.3 directors having doctor degree. One 
explanation is micro and nanotechnology has not been understood quite well in the 
application area and there is some tacit knowledge related with the technology applications 
(Linton & Walsh, 2004). Therefore, there should be some directors having a good knowledge 
on micro and nanotechnology for each startup. In addition, academic spinoffs are more likely 
to receive VC funding than non academic spinoffs.   
These are only the preliminary descriptive results. We are going to do further regression 
analysis to have a better knowledge on the relationship between these variables in the 
following parts. 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics  
  VC Funded startups Non VC Funded Startups T-test 
p 
value 
Variables Obs Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max Obs Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max   
News 749 1.6 5.76 0 91 1424 0.72 1.99 0 26 0.000 
Coefficient 
of 
favorableness 
749 0.15 0.37 -1 1 1424 0.09 0.31 -1 1 0.001 
Background 
heterogeneity 
720 0.4 0.22 0 0.8 1366 0.32 0.24 0 0.75 0.000 
Dum patent 749 0.58 0.49 0 1 1424 0.24 0.43 0 1 0.000 
Average 
citations 
749 0.18 0.67 0 8 1424 0.06 0.32 0 3.33 0.000 
meandoctor 720 0.31 0.26 0 1 1366 0.3 0.29 0 1 0.595 
Total 
publications 
720 44.43 99.55 0 774 1366 18.13 48.17 0 347 0.000 
dumaso 749 0.62 0.48 0 1 1424 0.46 0.49 0 1 0.000 
Startup age 749 5.22 3.57 0 15 1424 5.18 3.54 0 15 0.79 
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4.5.2 Regression analyses 
 
Table 5 reports the correlation matrix on the main variables. The largest correlation among 
our variables is 0.22, which indicates that multicollinearity is not a serious problem in our 
case.  
 
Table 5 Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 dumvcit 1          
2 Number of 
articles 
0.13*** 1         
3 Coefficient 
of 
favorableness 
0.15**** 0.22*** 1        
4 Background 
heterogeneity 
0.09*** 0.01 -0.004 1       
5 Dummy 
patent 
0.18*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 1      
6 Average 
citations  
0.01 -0.01 -0.004 0.04* 0.29*** 1     
7 Meandoctor  0.03 0.03* 0.04* 0.05** 0.06*** -0.09*** 1    
8 Total 
publications 
0.17*** 0.14*** 0.04** 0.1*** 0.11*** -0.002 0.08*** 1   
9 Dumaso 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.0002 0.24*** 0.12*** 1  
10 Startup age -0.1*** -0.02 -0.07* -0.05* 0.21*** 0.08*** -0.02 0.06*** -0.02 1 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The dependent variable in our analysis is a binary variable: the likelihood of receiving 
VC funding. Given the nature of the binary dependent variable, logit or probit model can be 
used in our case. We first use skprobit to perform a Lagrange Multiplier test for the 
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normality of the residuals of a probit model to see whether probit model is appropriate in 
our case. The results show that the normality hypothesis is not rejected in our case. 
Therefore probit model is more appropriate. Even though Hausman test is usually used to 
choose between random or fixed effect model for panel data, since probit model is more 
appropriate in our case and there is no probit model with fixed effect, we could only resort 
to probit model with random effect in our situation.  
Table 6 presents the results on the likelihood of receiving VC funding using Probit 
model with random effect. We start with a regression including only controls (model 1) and 
then we add the three independent variables one by one (model 2, model 3 and model 4). The 
coefficients on each of the three independent variables (news, coefficient of favorableness, 
and background heterogeneity) in all the models are significant and positive, giving support 
for all the hypotheses (H1, H2, and H3). Meanwhile, the coefficient on the “coefficient of 
favorableness” is larger than the coefficient of the “news”, indicating except for the number 
of articles, venture capitalists concern about more on the tone of articles and favorable news 
has more impacts on VC funding. Consistent with previous studies, we also provide support 
on the importance of patent behavior on VC funding. Except for management team 
occupational background heterogeneity, their scientific capabilities, measured by “total 
publications”, also have positive and significant influence on the likelihood of receiving VC 
funding. However, startup age is negatively related with the likelihood of receiving VC 
funding, suggesting that venture capitalists prefer to invest in early-stage development of 
startups.  
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Table 6 Regression results on the likelihood of receiving VC funding using Probit model with random effect  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Model Probit  
RE 
Probit  
RE 
Probit  
RE 
Probit  
RE 
News  0.04***(-0.01) 0.03***(-0.01) 0.03***(-0.01) 
Coefficient of favorableness   0.73***(-0.14) 0.73***(-0.14) 
Age heterogeneity    0.53*(-0.28) 
Dummy patent 0.84***(-0.14) 0.85***(-0.15) 0.82***(-0.14) 0.8***(-0.14) 
Average citations  -0.21(-0.16) -0.21(-0.17) -0.24(-0.17) -0.24(-0.17) 
Meandoctor  -0.07(-0.24) -0.1(-0.24) -0.15(-0.24) -0.15(-0.24) 
Total publications 0.003***(-0.001) 0.002***(-0.001) 0.002***(-0.001) 0.002***(-0.001) 
Dumaso 0.27(-0.17) 0.23(-0.18) 0.25(-0.17) 0.23(-0.18) 
Startup age -0.12***(-0.02) -0.12***(-0.02) -0.12***(-0.02) -0.12***(-0.02) 
Region dummies YES YES YES YES 
Constant -1.77***(-0.41) -1.82***(-0.42) -2.1***(-0.41) -2.29***(-0.43) 
Observations 2086 2086 2086 2086 
Num. of groups 197 197 197 197 
Log Likelihood -493.36 -486.84 -473.17 -471.37 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 
Lagrange Multiplier test p value 
0.56 0.69 0.93 0.67 
Note: *, ** or *** denote the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% or 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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4.5.3 Robustness check 
First, except for occupational background heterogeneity among team members, we also try to 
understand another team heterogeneity variable, age heterogeneity, to see how the results 
change. In the literature, the study on the influence of team heterogeneity is focused on firm 
performance. Age is related with a person‟s attitude, value and perspective since different age 
cohorts experience different social, political, and economic environments (Bantel and Jackson, 
1989). Different attitudes, values, and perspectives may facilitate creativity, which is beneficial 
for innovation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989). The empirical effect of management team age 
heterogeneity on firm performance is not in an unique direction. Anderson et al. (2009) find a 
positive relationship between age heterogeneity and firm performance using the Russell 1000 
industrial firms for 2003 and 2005. In contrast, Simons et al. (1999) find a negative influence of 
age heterogeneity on firm performance. To provide more insights on this issue, we are going to 
investigate the effect of age heterogeneity on VC funding.  
To know how heterogeneous a team is in terms of age, we first group directors according 
to their age: age between 21 and 30, age between 31 and 40, age between 41 and 50, age 
between 51 and 60, and age more than 60
1
. Then age heterogeneity is calculated with the 
Herfindal-Hirschman index.  
Consistent with the procedure in dealing with occupational background heterogeneity, we 
first resort to a Lagrange Multiplier test to choose between probit and logit model. The results 
                                                     
1
The directors’ age varies between 21 years old and 86 years old.  
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indicate residuals are normal and probit model is more appropriate in our case compared with 
logit model. Therefore, same to the situation when considering background heterogeneity, we 
choose probit model with random effect to do the regressions. We start with a model including 
only controls and then add independent invariables one by one. Table 7 presents the results 
using probit model with random effect specification. Similar to the results when considering 
occupational background heterogeneity, the coefficients on each of the three independent 
variables (news, coefficient of favorableness, and age heterogeneity) are positive and 
significant, and the effect of the coefficient of favorableness is larger than that of news on the 
likelihood of receiving VC funding.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 71 
 
Table 7 Regression results on the likelihood of receiving VC funding using random effect model (age heterogeneity case) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Model Probit  
RE 
Probit  
RE 
Probit  
RE 
Probit  
RE 
News  0.04***(0.01) 0.03***(0.01) 0.03***(0.01) 
Coefficient of favorableness   0.75***(0.14) 0.74***(0.14) 
Age heterogeneity    0.92***(0.26) 
Dummy patent 0.84***(0.15) 0.84***(0.15) 0.82***(0.15) 0.76***(0.15) 
Average citations  -0.22(0.16) -0.22(0.17) -0.25(0.17) -0.27(0.19) 
Meandoctor  -0.14(0.24) -0.18(0.25) -0.23(0.25) -0.27(0.26) 
Total publications 0.003***(0.001) 0.003***(0.001) 0.003***(0.001) 0.002***(0.18) 
Dumaso 0.29*(0.18) 0.25(0.18) 0．28(0.18) 0.24(0.18) 
Startup age -0.12***(0.02) -0.12***(0.02) -0.12***(0.02) -0.13***(0.02) 
Region dummies YES YES YES YES 
Constant -1.91***(0.44) -1.97***(0.44) -2.29***(0.44) -2.56***(0.46) 
Observations 2000 2000 2000 2000 
Num. of groups 191 191 191 191 
Log Likelihood -482.69 -476.19 -461.84 -455.35 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lagrange Multiplier test p value 0.49 0.7 0.96 0.74 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Second, the above results provide strong support that news, coefficient of favorableness, 
and management team heterogeneities have significant and positive effects on the likelihood of 
receiving VC funding. What about the effect of these variables on the duration needed to 
receive the first round VC financing for startups? As a robustness check, we also consider this 
issue. A classic way to deal with duration data is a hazard model. Since some startups have 
not received any VC by the end of 2010, the data is right-censored. In this situation, to know 
the effect of reputation along with management team heterogeneity on the probability of 
receiving VC funding, the Cox‟s proportional hazard model is a way which is a 
semi-parametric model. Moreover, the parametric models impose as much structures as they 
do the models. Therefore, compared to the parametric models, few restrictions related with 
the Cox proportional model can lead to a more accurate representation (Hellmann & Puri, 
2000). We thus decide to use the Cox proportional model in our case as other scholars 
investigating VC funding, such as Hellmann & Puri (2000), Haussler et al., (2008), etc. Table 
8 presents the results for the duration issue using the Cox‟s proportional hazard model when we 
refer management team heterogeneity to team occupational background heterogeneity. It is 
necessary to note that in our case the shorter the time startups waited for receiving VC funding, 
the better the outcome. That is, positive coefficients mean startups receive VC funding faster, 
and negative coefficients indicate slower. All the coefficients on the three independent variables 
are significant and positive, indicating that they have positive effects on shortening the duration 
needed to receive the first round VC funding. Therefore, reputation and management team 
heterogeneity not only have positive effects on the likelihood of receiving VC funds, but also 
shorten the duration needed to receive the first round VC funds for startups. Table 9 presents the 
results when we consider team age heterogeneity instead of team occupational background 
heterogeneity. Generalized visibility (measured by news) and generalized favorability 
(measured by the coefficient of favorableness) shorten the duration needed to receive the first 
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round VC funding. However, the effect of age heterogeneity is not so significant in this case.  
 
Table 8 Cox hazard model on the duration needed to receive VC funding with cluster 
adjusted standard deviation based on startups (occupational background heterogeneity 
case) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Number of articles  0.16*** 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
Coefficient of 
favorableness 
  1.63*** 
(0.33) 
1.74*** 
(0.33) 
Background heterogeneity    2.27** 
(0.96) 
Dummy patent 0.77** 
(0.39) 
0.76** 
(0.39) 
0.59 
(0.39) 
0.66* 
(0.39) 
Average citations  -0.06 
(0.36) 
-0.03 
(0.34) 
-0.11 
(0.36) 
-0.28 
(0.39) 
Meandoctor  -0.85 
(0.63) 
-0.68 
(0.65) 
-0.6 
(0.66) 
-0.95 
(0.78) 
Total publications 0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Dumaso 1.04** 
(0.46) 
0.95** 
(0.47) 
0.89* 
(0.52) 
0.82* 
(0.49) 
Region dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1416 1416 1416 1416 
Log Likelihood -353.07 -341.96 -330.61 -352.81 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Coefficients not hazard rations are shown. *, ** and *** denote significant at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 9 Cox hazard model on the duration needed to receive VC funding with cluster 
adjusted standard deviation based on startups (age heterogeneity case) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Number of articles  0.15*** 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
Coefficient of 
favorableness 
  1.65*** 
(0.31) 
1.61*** 
(0.32) 
Age heterogeneity   0.62 
(0.39) 
0.85 
(0.95) 
Dummy patent 0.81** 
(0.39) 
0.79** 
(0.39) 
-0.11 
(0.37) 
0.56 
(0.41) 
Average citations  -0.03 
(0.37) 
-0.02 
(0.36) 
-0.65 
(0.68) 
-0.12 
(0.38) 
Meandoctor  -0.94 
(0.66) 
-0.76 
(0.67) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.73 
(0.72) 
Total publications 0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.93* 
(0.54) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Dumaso 1.11** 
(0.49) 
0.99** 
(0.49) 
0.4 
(1.05) 
0.91* 
(0.54) 
Region dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1351 1351 1351 1351 
Log Likelihood -343.63 -332.82 -321.37 -320.67 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Coefficients not hazard rations are shown. *, ** and *** denote significant at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
   Our overall empirical results suggest that the two dimensions of reputation (generalized 
visibility and generalized favorability) have positive influence on the likelihood of receiving 
VC funding for startups, providing supports on H1 and H2. Management team heterogeneity, 
especially management team occupational background heterogeneity which is more directly 
related with team capabilities, is also positively associated with the likelihood of receiving VC 
funding. H3 is supported.  
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4.6 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we investigate the effect of different dimensions of reputation on the likelihood 
of receiving VC funding. Our results provide supports that generalized visibility and 
generalized favorability dimensions of reputation positively affect the likelihood of receive VC 
funding. Further, compared to generalized visibility, generalized favorability is more 
emphasized by venture capitalists. That is, except for generalized familiarity, venture capitalists 
do value the direction of media coverage. Therefore, we contribute to the literature by providing 
empirical support on the importance of reputation in VC funding. Practically, to attract VC 
funding, startups should devote certain time and energy in building reputation. If consider from 
the perspective of venture capitalists, expect for those signals have been studied in the literature, 
they should also consider the reputation of startups, especially the favorable reputation of 
startups, since there are many merits related with favorable reputation, such as building 
strategic barrier to competitors and attracting other critical resources 
About management team heterogeneity, as predicted, there is a positive relationship 
between occupational background heterogeneity and the likelihood of receiving VC funding. 
Occupational background reflects professional orientation. A team with diversified 
occupational backgrounds is more likely to possess different professional expertises leading to 
diversified capabilities which is important on team capabilities and firm performance. 
Therefore, venture capitasts perfer a management team with diversified professional 
backgrounds. Startups should consider this issue when recruiting new directors.  
To have a better understanding on team heterogeneity, we also analyze the effect of team 
age heterogeneity on VC funding. Our empirical results show that there is a significant 
relationship between them. Due to the limit of data, we only compare the differenct effects of 
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age heterogeneity and occupational background heterogeneity on VC funding, future work 
could make a further comparion of other aspects of team heterogeneity on VC funding, such as 
directors‟ birth place which may affect the way of thinking, sexual diversity, and so on.  
Since we only focus on one sector, the micro and nanotechnology sector, generalizations 
of our results to other sectors should be careful. Future work could gather data on different 
sectors and test the effect of different dimensions on the access to VC funding.  
We test the influence of reputation on VC funding in this chapter. Because of the “coach” 
role of venture capitalists, VC funding could also be a signal influencing reputation. This is 
another direction for future work.  
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5 Does VC funding increase trademarking in 
startups? 
This chapter is the second empirical study, investigating the effect of VC funding on startups‟ 
trademarking activities. It is organized as follows: first there is the introduction section 
introducing why trademarking can be used as a proxy for innovation and the research question 
of this study “what is the impact of VC funding on the startup‟s propensity to file trademarks? 
Does VC funding lead to the registration of broader trademarks?” Then literature review about 
registered trademarks and innovation, and the determinants of trademarking activity is 
discussed in section 2. Section 3 proposes hypotheses. Section 4 presents research context. 
Section 5 discusses sample and variables and results are discussed in Section 6. Finally section 
7 gives conclusions and directions for future research.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The quest to convert inventions (promising novel technical ideas) into successful innovations 
(commercialized products) is a central challenge for technology-based start-ups. As highlighted 
by Chandy et al (2006), “firms, whether they work out of tiny garages or in sprawling research 
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labs, sink much hard-earned capital to generate inventions and bring them speedily to market”. 
Turning promising ideas or patented inventions into successful products, however, is a 
long-term process involving high risks of failure. As to this point, several contributions in the 
entrepreneurship literature have shown that venture capital firms, operating as professional and 
active investors, tend to substantially support their investee companies in enhancing their 
innovation outcomes. Scholars that have analyzed the relationship between VC investments 
and innovation have frequently resorted to patent data in order to proxy theinnovative 
performance of new ventures, generally finding a positive impact of VC funding on patenting 
levels (Kortum & Lerner, 1998). This approach, however, presents some limitations. On the one 
hand, there are well-known limits in the use of patents as a proxy of innovation outcomes 
(Griliches, 1990). Given that innovation is a complex process leading from invention to 
commercialization (Baregheh et al., 2009), patent counts (and R&D expenditures) are fairly 
effective proxies only for characterizing the upstream side of firms‟ innovative processes – i.e. 
the creation of inventions. However, they poorly represent the downstream side – i.e. the 
commercialization of innovations -, since many patented inventions tend to never be converted 
into innovations and commercialized products (Gambardella al., 2007; Munari and Sobrero, 
2011). 
A recent and rapidly expanding stream of the literature has focused on trademark 
registrations in order to provide a different and complementary perspective on firms‟ 
innovation activities. As trademarks reflect the introduction of new products or services into the 
market, they are suited to characterize the ability of firms to bring promising ideas to market 
(Jensen & Webster, 2011; Mendonça et al., 2004). As to this point, several empirical 
contributions (Gallè and Legros, 2012; Jensen and Webster, 2004; Mendonça et al., 2004; 
Schmoch, 2003) have convincingly established a tight association between trademarking 
activity and innovation, even in sectors characterized by a low propensity to patent (i.e. service 
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sectors). However, studies on firms‟ trademarking activities have mostly focused on large and 
established companies, whereas the analysis of new ventures is almost entirely absent in the 
literature (a notable exception is represented by the recent section by Helmers and Rogers, 
2012). Also, there has been no attempt to theoretically and empirically assess the impact of VC 
funding on trademarking activity of new ventures. 
In this chapter we try to complete the picture by analyzing the effect of VC funding on the 
trademarking activities, exploiting an original dataset of startups operating in the micro and 
nanotechnology sector in the United Kingdom. We address the following novel research 
questions: what is the impact of VC funding on the startups‟ propensity to file trademarks? 
Does VC funding lead to the registration of broader trademarks? 
Empirically, we exploit a hand-collected panel dataset related to 192 new ventures from 
the micro and nanotechnology sector in the United Kingdom to compare the trademarking 
activity of VC-backed startups vis-à-vis a control group of other (non VC-backed) new 
ventures. More precisely, we assess the trademarking activity of VC-backed companies before 
and after the first round of VC financing (also with respect to the control group) along three 
different dimensions: the likelihood (or not) to trademark; the number of registered trademarks; 
the average breadth of registered trademarks (as measured by the number of different NICE 
classes). Our results highlight that VC funding does have a positive influence on startups‟ 
trademarking activities, including the propensity to register trademarks and the number and the 
breadth of trademarks registered.  
The rest of the section is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant 
literature, whereas Section 3 discusses our hypotheses. Section 4 presents the research context, 
and the data and the variables are in section 5. Section 6 presents and discusses the findings of 
our analyses and section 7 presents the conclusions and directions for future research. 
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5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1. Registered Trademarks and Innovation 
 
A trademark is, in principle, a sign. The function of trademarks is to distinguish products or 
services of one firm from those of others, in order to prevent consumers‟ confusion. The 
economic rationale underlying the protection of trademarks has its roots in economic theories 
of information and reputation (Landes and Posner, 1987; Menell and Scotchmer, 2007; Ramello, 
2006). Trademarks make it possible for consumers to distinguish the products of one company 
from those of competitors, thus reducing search costs and potential adverse selection. Due to 
this differentiation role guaranteed by trademarks, firms are encouraged to provide products or 
services of a consistent and reliable quality, or even improve the quality of their products or 
services, in order not to depreciate the value of the trademark in the future (Ramello, 2006). 
Trademarks grant the exclusive right to use a sign and thus provide the firm with a temporary 
monopoly. Thanks to this role, trademarks can be used as an entry barrier (Greenhalgh & 
Rogers, 2005) and could enhance a firm‟s ability to generate financial returns from new 
products or services (Mendonça et al., 2004; Ramello, 2006; Rujas, 1999; Sandner & Block, 
2011). 
Trademarks are generally associated with the development and commercialization of new 
inventions (Schmoch & Gauch, 2009) and could be seen as an element in the process of 
innovation (Davis, 2006; Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2005). When a firm intends to attract new 
customers and change its position in the market thanks to the introduction of new products or 
services, trademarks are a good way to both advertise and protect the new position (Millot, 
2009). A strong, consistent finding in the literature, indeed, reveals that the propensity to use 
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trademarks and registered designs significantly depends on the intensity and type of innovation 
activities performed by the company (Schmoch, 2003; Mendonca et al., 2004; Millot, 2009). A 
strong correlation between trademark usage and innovation intensity is well established in a 
series of academic studies. For example, the CIS 3 survey data quoted by Mendonca et al. (2004) 
for the different EU countries indicate that innovative firms use trademarks and registered 
designs more than less innovative firms. Schmoch (2003) uses survey data for German firms 
referring to the year 2001 and finds a significant correlation between trademarks and innovation 
(measured as share of turnover generated with new products and new services) in both 
manufacturing and service industries. In a similar vein, a study of Australian companies by 
Jensen and Webster (2004) finds that trademarking activity is linked to measures of innovation 
and product design. Gallè and Legros (2012), analysing a sample of 5295 French companies 
during the period 2001-2004 based on CIS4 data, note that the probability of using trademarks 
and registered designs (as well as patents) increases with product innovation activity.  
Comparing trademarks with patents, both of them give the owner a temporary monopoly 
on the protected entity (Mendonça et al., 2004; Rujas, 1999), but while patents are more related 
to the technological aspects of innovation, trademarks are mostly associated with the 
commercial aspects of it (Rujas, 1999). Moreover, trademarks - and the brands they protect - 
foster consumer loyalty (Ramello and Silva, 2006). Accordingly, if patented products have 
been trademarked before the patent‟s expiration, trademarks can provide some form of 
protection even after a patent has expired because trademarks can be renewed indefinitely by 
paying renewal fees (Rujas, 1999). In this sense, with respect to other knowledge assets which 
are prone to erode with time, trademarks become increasingly valuable as time passes (Sandner 
& Block, 2011). Finally, trademarks can be registered for both service sectors and 
manufacturing sectors whereas patents are mostly used to protect actual products (Greenhalgh, 
Longland, & Bosworth, 2001).  
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5.2.2 The Determinants of Trademarking Activity 
 
Empirical literature on firms‟ trademarking behavior is still limited and in an early stage of 
development, with only a few studies analyzing the determinants of the use of registered 
trademarks (Amara et al., 2008; Gallè and Legros, 2012; Mendonça et al., 2004; Schmoch, 
2004), and a more sizeable number of studies looking at the impact of trademarking on 
economic performance (Helmers and Rogers, 2011; Krasnikov et al., 2007), market value 
(Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2006; Sandner and Bloch, 2011) or employment levels (Greenhalgh 
and Rogers, 2012). Looking at the former set of studies, their findings suggest that the firm‟s 
propensity to use registered trademarks depends on a series of factors, in large part related to the 
characteristics of the industry and of the firm. As is the case for patents, significant variation 
appears across industries in their propensity to use trademarks. In a study of UK manufacturing 
and service firms, Greehalgh et al. (2001) show that the distribution of trademark applications 
propensities varies substantially across sectors: the percentage of firms with trademarks is 
highest in the retail sector, whereas it is lowest in the real estate. Moreover, the propensity to 
register a community trademark is lower than the likelihood to register a UK trademark in all 
sectors (Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2007). In a similar vein, the results of a 2003 survey among 
Portuguese companies, as reported by Mendonca et al. (2004), show that significant differences 
in trademark activity emerge across manufacturing sectors according to their level of 
technological intensity. According to this study, companies in “higher-tech” sectors (by OECD 
classification) tend to care about and actually use trademarks more in the course of their 
business activity than firms in “lower-tech” sectors. In contrast with patents though, trademarks 
seem diffused also in sectors where patenting activity is particularly limited, such as in low-tech 
industries or service sectors.  
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Looking at firm-level determinants, consistent with the findings from patent literature, 
studies regarding the use of trademarks report a significant role of firm size. A larger firm is 
generally associated with a higher propensity of registering trademarks (Amara et al., 2008; 
Bordoy et al., 2007). Amara et al. (2008) conduct a survey of 2625 service firms in Canada to 
assess the mix of IP mechanisms – patents, trademarks and registered designs – they used. Their 
regression analyses reveal that firm size is positively and significantly associated with the use 
of all three protection methods. Firm size is also positively associated with the registration of 
trademarks in studies by Gallié and Legros in France (2012) and Munari and Santoni in Italy 
(2011)
2
. Other important factors associated to trademarking activity according to the literature 
deal with the level of market share (Galliè and Legros, 2012), the affiliation with a business 
group (Galliè and Legros, 2012; Hanel, 2006) and the degree of internationalization of the 
company (Munari and Santoni, 2011; Thoma and Birker, 2012). 
In the light of such results, therefore, small enterprises, and new ventures in particular, 
should face significant constraints in their ability to register trademarks. There are different 
reasons to explain such evidence. A first explanation deals with the costs related to the drafting, 
deposit and renewal of trademarks, which can represent a significant financial burden for new 
enterprises. Trademarking has both direct and indirect costs to startups, including direct 
monetary fees to file trademarks, opportunity costs of time devoted to the filing process, and 
                                                     
2
A partial exception with regard to trademarks appears in work of Jensen and Webster (2004), who compare the 
intensity of IP usage (ratio of IP applications to the number of employees) between large firms and SMEs in a large 
sample of Australian firms over 1994–2001. Their regression analyses, controlling for technology, production and 
supply characteristics, show no significant differences in the rates of patenting and trademarks by firm size. 
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other administrative costs, such as the costs to understand trademarking rules and filing 
procedures, to file a trademark application for each class of goods or services, to file a statement 
of use and to demonstrate its commercial use. Then at regular intervals, the applicant needs to 
show that the trademark has been used in commerce for five consecutive years and pay 
extension fees (Giarratana & Torrisi, 2010). Moreover, trademarks (and other registered IPRs) 
are costly to monitor and enforce – both in terms of direct legal costs and in terms of indirect 
business costs of litigation. Since new ventures may not possess enough financial resources to 
engage in legal disputes and face the related risks, they could prefer to recur to informal 
protection mechanisms.  
To an extent that trademarking- related costs are sizeable for startups, VC funding could 
allow them to meet these costs. However, despite such observations, there has been a very 
limited attention in the literature to the trademarking behavior of new ventures, and the role 
played in this respect by VC investors. As to the first point, an exception is represented by the 
study of Helmer and Rogers (2010) analyzing the effects of patents and trademarks on the 
performance and survival probabilities of a sample of nearly 162,000 British new ventures 
founded in 2001. By focusing on four types of IPRs (UK patent filings, EPO patent filings, UK 
trademark filings, and Community trademark filings) to capture innovation activity, they show 
that UK trademarks are the IPR mechanism most commonly used by such startups, followed by 
community trademarks and then UK patents. When analyzing the relationship between 
innovation and the survival rates of new firms, the authors find that patenting lowers the 
probability of exist in only some sectors, whereas trademarking lowers the probability in almost 
all sectors (Helmers & Rogers, 2010). The only section, to our knowledge, addressing the 
relationship between VC funding and trademarking activity is a recent working section by 
Block et al. (2012). Using a sample of US VC transactions from 1998 to 2007, the authors find 
that the presence and number of trademarks in a start-up relates positively to the start-up‟s 
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financial valuation by VCs. Therefore, VCs value trademarks as a signal of the start-up‟s ability 
to innovate and market orientation. This study, however, does not analyze changes in 
trademarking behavior before and after the VC transaction. Moreover, since it focuses only on a 
sample of VC-backed start-ups, it does not allow to compare the trademarking behavior of 
VC-backed companies and other start-ups.  
 
5.3 Hypotheses 
 
As we mentioned before, trademark registrations involve both direct and indirect costs to 
startups. As a first, simple, explanation, it can be argued that the receipt of VC funding makes 
startups capable of incurring these costs, thus facilitating the recourse to IP protection 
mechanisms. In addition to that, in addition to financial support, venture capitalists also act as 
monitor and coacher for their investees (Gompers & Lerner, 2001a). Venture capitalists indeed 
provide valuable suggestions on strategic planning and marketing management to portfolio 
startups, and startups are quite short of these capabilities internally. This is typically critical for 
technology based startups, since most founders of these startups have technological 
backgrounds and their competences are mainly related with technological inventions, rather 
that the commercialization of innovations. In addition to that, venture capitalists usually rely on 
staged capital infusion mechanisms to alleviate the information asymmetry problem and reduce 
the investment risks (Gompers & Lerner, 2001a; Gompers, 1995). To receive subsequent funds, 
trademarks, which reflect the potential economic worth of innovations are an important factor 
influencing the decision of venture capitalists. Therefore, to receive subsequent rounds of 
funding, startups are expected to be active in trademarking activity.  
In short, considering the many functions provided by trademarks, the coaching functions 
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performed by venture capitalists, coupled with the possibility that financial success could affect 
a firm‟s innovation activity (Heimonen, 2012), it is reasonable to believe that upon receiving 
VC funding, startups will be more likely to file trademarks. 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, in the case of new ventures, receiving VC funding is positively 
associated with the likelihood of filing trademarks. 
 
In addition to provide strategic support and marketing management advice, which may 
influence startups‟ decision to trademark, venture capitalists may also boost startups‟ inventions. 
First, venture capitalists are known for their capability to pick up future successful startups and 
VC-backed startups are often those which generate innovations that could penetrate huge 
markets (Cao & Hsu, 2011). Second, venture capitalists‟ monitoring and coaching role 
stimulates startups‟ incentives towards invention. Moreover, once providing investment, 
venture capitalists have a direct interest to help investees and drive them toward economic 
success. Their commitment and involvement, for instance the involvement in recruiting 
scientific personnel, favor startups‟ inventions (Arqué-Castells, 2012). New inventions with 
high potential economic returns are often protected with new trademarks, rather than existing 
ones (Schmoch & Gauch, 2009). Therefore, more inventions spurred by VC financing may lead 
to more trademark filing. Except for more inventions, VC financing also facilitate product 
upgrade. New products are always related with new trademarks.  
     Moreover, the involvement of VC Funding may improve investees‟ product 
competitiveness and market share leading to the investees entering into international market. 
Consequently, to protect their market share, the possibility to file trademarks in the 
corresponding countries increases. Therefore, VC funding is related with more trademarking 
filing.  
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H2: Ceteris paribus, in the case of new ventures, receiving VC funding positively impacts 
the number of trademark registrations.  
 
Another important dimension which is likely to be affected by VC funding in the case of new 
ventures is the breadth of trademark registrations. This indicates the market scope of a 
registered trademark, by specifying the set of market segments in which the legal protection of 
a trademark can be used. Trademarks with a broader scope tend to protect different kinds of 
products or wider product lines (Sandner & Block, 2011). Given that VC firms are particularly 
interested in high-growth companies, it is likely that they place more emphasis on the pursuit of 
diversification strategies by investee companies. Moreover, diversification strategy, especially 
those diversifying mainly into those areas that share some common core resources, is related 
with higher levels of profitability (Rumelt, 1982). This could result in more diversified 
inventions compared to non-venture backed startups. Even though product diversification is a 
risky strategy for resource constrained startups, since many products share the same critical 
resources and diversification could bring superior performance, it is expected that VC-backed 
startups will be more likely to file trademarks with wider breadth. Also, thanks to a diversified 
product portfolio, startups‟ resources are bundled and it becomes more difficult for competitors 
to imitate their products (Wan, Hoskisson, Short, & Yiu, 2011). For such reasons, we expect the 
following: 
 
H3: Ceteris paribus, in the case of new ventures, receiving VC funding positively impacts 
the breadth of registered trademarks.  
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5.4 Research context: the MNT sector in the United Kingdom 
 
We test our hypotheses in the context of the micro and nanotechnology sector in the United 
Kingdom. We adopt a definition of nanotechnology as “the design, characterization, production, 
and application of structures, devices, and systems by controlled manipulation of size and shape 
at the nanometer scale (atomic, molecular, and macromolecular scale) that produces structures, 
devices, and systems with at least one novel/superior characteristic or property" (Bawa et al, 
2005). The MNT sector in the United Kingdom is a very interesting and appropriate setting to 
study the relationship between VC and trademarking activity for several reasons. First, the UK 
market is second only to the US in the world for what concerns the development of the venture 
capital industry (Lockett, Murray, & Wright, 2002). Moreover, the MNT sector in the United 
Kingdom has been characterized by a significant growth over the last two decades, largely 
driven by the emergence of innovative start-ups and the infusion of risk capital by VC funds 
(Libaers et al., 2006). Finally, this setting has been already studied by other academic works, 
which thus represent an useful benchmark for our research (Munari & Toschi, 2011).  
 
5.5 Sample and variables 
5.5.1. Sample 
 
To test our hypotheses we use an original, hand-collected dataset of UK startup firms from the 
MNT sector founded from the year 1996. We constructed the dataset through the following six 
steps. First, we identified the population of startups operating in the MNT sector founded from 
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1996 according to the “Industrial Map of UK MNT”, an exhaustive map compiled in 2004 by 
the MNT Network in association with the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). From 
this source, it was possible to identify 193 new ventures founded from 1996 and onwards. 
Detailed information about these companies in the report includes the year of foundation, the 
registered address and a brief company description. Second, we use Companies House (the 
register including information on all limited companies in England, Wales, Northern Ireland 
and Scotland) to check for name changes and status for all the startups included in this first 
sample. Since company name may be altered with time and both VC funding information and 
trademark information should be retrieved according to company name, we obtained 
information on all the names in history used by each startup. Third, Thomson One (formerly, 
VentureXpert) was used to collect VC funding information for all the startups. In this way, we 
were able to ascertain whether a startup received VC funding or not, and the date of first round 
of VC financing. Through Thomson One, we were able to identify additional 9 startups 
operating in the nanotechnology sector.   
Fourth, UK trademark and community trademark data was then collected respectively 
from the online databases of the UK Intellectual Property Office and of the OHIM (Office for 
the Harmonization of Internal Markets). There are two dates associated with each trademark: 
the filing date and the registration date. Since trademark filing has already reflected directors‟ 
sense of commercializing inventions and protecting their brand, we use filing date as the 
relevant date in our analyses.  
Information on the directors of each startup was then gathered from FAME, the database 
managed by Bureau and Van D containing comprehensive economic and legal information on 
companies in the UK and Ireland. For 10 startups we were not able to find related information 
in FAME, and we exclude them consequently from the sample. Therefore, our final sample 
includes 192 startups. Detailed director information from FAME include current and previous 
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list of directors with title, appointment date, resignation date and birthday for each director. 
Based on the appointment date and resignation date, we manually computed the tenure of each 
director with the company. We also used the database Company Director Check in order to 
collect information on each director‟s previous work experience as directors in other different 
firms.  
In short, we were able to construct an unbalanced panel dataset on 192 startups established 
from 1996, including 67 VC-funded (around 35% of our sample) and 125 non VC-funded 
startups. 70 startups (36% of our sample) filed at least one trademark during the observation 
period.  
 
5.5.2. Variables 
 
Trademarking activity of startups is measured by three variables: the likelihood to file 
trademarks (markit), the number of filed trademarks (nmarkit), and the breadth of filed 
trademarks (bmarkit). Markit is a dummy which takes the value 1 if company i filed at least one 
trademark in a year t, and zero otherwise. Nmarkit measures the number of trademarks filed by 
company i in year t. The breadth of trademarks bmarkit is measured by the total number of 
different NICE classes on all the trademarks filed by the focal startup in year t.  
Our independent variable related to VC funding- dumvct it–is a dummy taking value 1 for 
VC-backed startups from the year of first round of VC funding onwards, and zero otherwise.  
We also include in our regression analyses several control variables that may be expected 
to influence trademarking activity. The age of a company influences its propensity to innovate 
and ultimate innovation results (Arqué-Castells, 2012). Therefore, we included a variable Ageit 
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in order to measure the age of the company (since its founding year) in each year t. Concerning 
the characteristics of a startup‟s directors, prior experience as directors in other firms is likely to 
positively influence their ability to strengthen the competences of the startups, including the 
innovation and marketing competences. The same can be said by the educational levels of the 
directors, which may have a positive impact on the startup‟s innovative results. Therefore, 
dumexperienceit is a dummy variable taking value 1 if any director of the focal startup in a given 
year has had prior directorship experience in other firms. Another dummy variable dumPhDit 
takes value 1 if any director of the focal startup in a given year has a PhD title. 
Moreover, old directors and young directors have different experiences shaping their 
different attitudes and values. Diversity of attitudes and values facilitate creativity (Bantel & 
Jackson, 1989). We expect the more diversified are the ages of the company directors, the more 
ability a startup has for dealing with innovation and trademarking activity. We thus computed a 
variable ageheterogeneityit by dividing directors into 5 groups with respect to their ages: 
directors with ages between 20 and 30; ages between 31 and 40; ages between 41 and 50; ages 
between 51 and 60; and ages older than 60
3
. Then age heterogeneity is calculated with the 
following formula (Bantel & Jackson, 1989): 
ageheterogeneity = 1 − Σp𝑖
2 
where p is the proportion of team members in each of the five age categories, with i signaling 
each category. 
To control for influential factors related to the business and technological cycle, we 
include a set of 16 year dummies. As shown by Table 10, more than 80% startups received their 
first round VC and filed their first trademark during the same period, that is, between the year 
2000 and 2007. This fact tells us that this period may be a flourish period of business cycle and 
                                                     
3
In our sample, the youngest director is 21 years old. 
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technological cycle.  
 
Table 10 Distribution of the Years in which Startups Received their First Round of 
VC-Financing and their First Trademark 
  Receiving First VC Filing First Trademark 
Year Frequency Percentage Cumulative Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
1996 
   
1 1.43 1.43 
1997 2 2.99 2.99 0 0 1.43  
1998 2 2.99 5.98 1 1.43 2.86 
1999 2 2.99 8.97 2 2.86 5.72 
2000 14 20.9 29.87 6 8.57 14.29 
2001 7 10.45 40.32 12 17.14 31.43 
2002 6 8.96 49.28 6 8.57 40 
2003 7 10.45 59.73 7 10 50 
2004 6 8.96 68.69 9 12.86 62.86 
2005 8 11.94 80.63 5 7.14 70 
2006 2 2.99 83.62 9 12.86 82.86 
2007 5 7.46 91.08 7 10 92.86 
2008 2 2.99 94.07 2 2.86 95.72 
2009 1 1.49 95.56  0  0 95.72 
2010 2 2.99 98.55 2 2.86 98.58 
2011 1 1.49 100 1 1.43 100 
Total 67 100   70 100   
 
Innovation is sensitive to the geographic location of each company, due to spillover effects 
and to the positive influence of local networks in facilitating resource acquisition (Almeida & 
Kogut, 1997). Therefore, a set of 12 region dummies are included. 
All the variables used here and the sources used to search the information are summarized 
in Table 11. 
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Table 11 Summary of Variables and data Sources 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent Variables 
Markit 
Dummy taking the value of 1 if the focal 
startup filed at least one trademark at 
year t 
OHIM and UK IPO 
Nmarkit 
The total number of filed trademarks by 
the focal startup at year t 
OHIM and UK IPO 
Bmarkit 
The breadth of filed trademarks by the 
focal startup at year t 
OHIM and UK IPO 
Independent Variables 
Dumvct 
Dummy with value 1 for VC-funded 
startups from the year of VC entry 
onwards  
Thomson One 
Control Variables 
Dumexperience 
Dummy with value 1 if any company 
director has previous directorship 
experience in other firms 
FAME; Company 
Director Check 
DumPhD 
Dummy with value 1 if any director is a 
doctor 
FAME; Company 
Director Check 
Ageheterogeneity 
Management team age heterogeneity in a 
given year for a startup 
FAME 
Year dummies A set of 16 year dummies MNT 
Region dummies A set of 12 region dummies MNT 
Age Startup's age MNT 
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5.6 Results 
5.6.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
Table 12 presents descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this section. The mean 
likelihood of trademarking for a startup in a given year is 0.068. The mean number of filed 
trademarks per year for the sample companies is 0.136, whereas the mean breadth of 
trademarks is 0.205. The mean value of dumexperience is 0.865, indicating most startups have 
at least one director with prior directorship experience. Similarly, around half of the startups 
have at least one director with PhD title. This result is consistent with the fact that as a high 
technology, the application of micro and nanotechnology is still not perfectly understood and 
the use of it is associated with some tacit knowledge, requiring to include experts in the 
management team. Startups studied in this chapter have the average age of 5 years old.  
 
Table 12 Descriptive Statistics (Main Variables) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Markit 2074 0.068 0.252 0 1 
Nmark 2074 0.136 0.651 0 15 
Bmark 2074 0.205 1.024 0 19 
Dumvct 2074 0.274 0.446 0 1 
Dumexperience 1868 0.865 0.341 0 1 
DumPhD 1963 0.678 0.467 0 1 
Ageheterogeneity 1895 0.432 0.261 0 1 
Age 2074 5.261 3.633 0 15 
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    Table 13 shows that, generally, 67 startups received VC funding and 70 startups filed 
trademarks. It suggests that VC-backed startups tend to receive the first round of financing and 
file their first trademark when they are very young. Moreover, it suggests that VC-backed 
startups are more likely to receive the first round VC first and then file their first trademark (for 
instance, at the founding year, 22% startups received their first round VC but only 15% filed 
their first trademark). 
 
Table13 Distribution of Startup Age when Receiving First VC Funding and Filing First 
Trademark 
  Received First VC Funding Filed First Trademark 
Age Frequency Percentage Cumulative Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
0 15 22.39 22.39 11 15.71 15.71 
1 16 23.88 46.27 11 15.17 31.42 
2 8 11.94 58.21 15 21.43 52.85 
3 9 13.43 71.64 4 5.71 58.56 
4 3 4.48 76.12 9 12.86 71.42 
5 8 11.94 88.06 6 8.57 79.99 
6 4 5.97 94.03 4 5.71 85.7 
7 2 2.99 97.02 1 1.43 87.13 
8 0 0 97.02 1 1.43 88.56 
9 1 1.49 98.51 5 7.14 95.7 
10 1 1.49 100 1 1.43 97.1 
11 
   
1 1.43 98.56 
14 
   
1 1.43 100 
Total 67 100   70 100   
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Table 14 shows that 51% of venture-backed startups filed at least one trademark; whereas 
only 29% of non VC-backed funded ones filed for trademarks. The chi-squared test confirms 
that the difference in the frequency levels between the two groups is statistically significant at 1% 
level. 
 
Table 14 Likelihood of Trademarking: VC-Funded vs. Non VC-Funded Startups 
Variable Group 
VC-Funded Startups Non VC-Funded Startups 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Dummy 
trademark 
Yes 34 50.75 36 28.8 
No 33 49.25 89 71.2 
Total 67 100 125 100 
Pearson 
Chi-square 
9.0688 
P value 0.003 
 
Moreover, for the sample of VC-backed companies, it can be seen from Table 15 that the 
propensity to trademark is higher after the first round of VC financing rather than before. In 
more detail, 29 VC-backed startups (43% of them) show trademark filing activity after first VC 
funding, as compared to only 12 of them (18%) before VC entry. Even more striking, the 
average number of trademarks filed per company after VC entry is more than twice the number 
of trademarks before VC entry (4.38 trademarks after vs. 2.08 trademarks before). 
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Table 15 Venture Capital Funding, Number of Trademarks and Timing of 
Trademarking Activity 
 VC Funded Startups Non VC Funded Startups 
Total 
Number of 
Trademarks 
Number of 
Startups 
Trademarking 
Average 
Number of 
Trademarks 
per Startup 
Total 
Number of 
Trademarks 
Number of 
Startups 
Trademarking 
Average 
Number of 
Trademarks 
per Startup 
Trademark 
filing: 
152 34 4.47 131 36 3.64 
…before 
VC 
funding 
25 12 2.08 - -   
…after 
VC 
funding 
127 29 4.38 - -   
 
Taken together, Table 14 and Table 15 seem to suggest that compared with non VC-backed 
startups, VC-backed startups are in general more active in trademarking activity, and that a 
significant increase in trademarking activity occurs after VC entry. However, firm-specific 
characteristics which may affect both VC financing and trademarking activity are not 
considered in these statistics. We therefore undertake more systematic regression analyses in 
order to investigate in more detail the impact of VC on trademarking.  
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5.6.2 Regression analyses 
 
Table 16 reports the correlation matrix on all the variables. It does not indicate the presence of 
multicollinearity issues in our case.  
 
Table 16 Correlation Matrix (Main Variables) 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Mark 1               
2 Nmark 0.77* 1             
3 Bmark 0.75* 0.65* 1           
4 Dumvct 0.08* 0.08* 0.05* 1         
5 Dumexperience 0.08* 0.07* 0.06* 0.16* 1       
6 DumPhD 0.06* 0.05* 0.03 0.13* 0.03 1     
7 Ageheterogeneity 0.06* 0.05* 0.02 0.20* 0.36* 0.27* 1   
8 Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.004 0.18* 0.05* -0.01 0.07* 1 
* correlation is significant at 5% level. 
 
Three dependent variables are used in our analyses: the probability of trademarking in 
each year, the number of trademark applications per year and the breadth of trademarks per year. 
We thus estimated different regression models using panel data approaches, given the 
longitudinal nature of our data. We used a logit model for variable on the probability of 
trademarking, given its dummy nature. As far as the number of trademark filings and the 
breadth of trademarks are concerned, we choose the negative binomial model, since we are 
dealing with count data (we also used a Poisson model as robustness check, as shown in the 
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next section of the section).  
Following the classical process to deal with panel data, we first run a Hausman test to 
choose between fixed effect and random effect model. The Hausman test results reveal that for 
all the models, a random effect model is appropriate. Table 17 thus presents our regression 
results using the random effects specification.  
To ensure the robustness of results, when analyzing the effect of dumvcton the three 
dependent variables (Model 1, 2 and 3), we start with a univariate regression which only 
includes dumvct as explanatory variable (Column 1 of Model 1, 2, and 3). Then in Column 2 of 
each model, we control for team characteristics. We then additionally include the remaining 
control variables - namely startup age, regional dummies and year dummies - in Column 3 of 
each model to see how the results change.  
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Table 17 Main Regression Results 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Mark Nmark Bmark 
Model 
Logit 
RE 
Logit 
RE 
Logit 
RE 
Negative 
binomial 
RE 
Negative 
binomial 
RE 
Negative 
binomial 
RE 
Negative 
binomial 
RE 
Negative 
binomial 
RE 
Negative 
binomial 
RE 
Dumvct 0.69** 
(0.28) 
0.51* 
(0.28) 
0.54* 
(0.3) 
0.77*** 
(0.23) 
0.66*** 
(0.23) 
0.65*** 
(0.25) 
0.71*** 
(0.23) 
0.62*** 
(0.23) 
0.56** 
(0.26) 
Dumexperience  0.85 
(0.56) 
0.79 
(0.58) 
 0.95* 
(0.52) 
0.92* 
(0.53) 
 1.02** 
(0.52) 
0.88 
(0.54) 
DumPhD  0.36 
(0.29) 
0.22 
(0.31) 
 0.37 
(0.25) 
0.19 
(0.25) 
 0.26 
(0.25) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
Ageheterogeneity  1.04* 
(0.57) 
1.15** 
(0.59) 
 0.58 
(0.47) 
0.69 
(0.49) 
 0.26 
(0.47) 
0.49 
(0.49) 
Age   0.03 
(0.08) 
  0.02 
(0.06) 
  0.05 
(0.06) 
Region Dummies No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Constant -3.43*** 
(0.22) 
-4.87*** 
(0.59) 
-5.42*** 
(1.17) 
-1.92*** 
(0.22) 
-3.33*** 
(0.56) 
-3.56*** 
(0.7) 
-2.62*** 
(0.2) 
-3.87*** 
(0.54) 
-6.28*** 
(1.35) 
Observations 1820 1820 1820 1820 1820 1820 1820 1820 1820 
N. startups 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 
Log Likelihood 
Prob> chi2 
-444.22 
<0.01 
-438.36 
<0.01 
-420.97 
<0.05 
-639.63 
<0.01 
-634.44 
<0.01 
-615.4 
<0.01 
-686.83 
<0.01 
-683.01 
<0.01 
-653.79 
<0.01 
Hausman test p 
value 
0.198 0.11 0.85 0.59 0.26 1 0.87 0.6 0.89 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Standard errors in parentheses.
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The coefficients of the variable dumvct in the different specifications of model (1) are all 
positive and statistically significant at 10% level, giving support for our first hypothesis H1. 
The coefficients for dumvct in the three columns are also positive in Model 2 related to the 
number of trademark applications, showing a more pronounced statistical significance (at the 1% 
level). This indicates a strong positive effect of VC funding on the intensity of trademark 
applications. Finally, as for the breadth of trademarks, the results in Model 3 indicate a positive 
and statistically significant effect (at the 5% level) of the variable related to VC funding, thus 
supporting our third hypothesis. The only significant control variable in model 1 is directors‟ 
age heterogeneity. Even though other control variables are not significant, they enter with the 
predicted sign. Moving to model 2 and 3, year 1996 has a significant and positive influence on 
the number of trademark applications and the breadth of trademarks. This is maybe because the 
community trademark application system was first introduced in 1996.  
In short, after controlling for a set of potentially influential factors, our findings provide a 
robust support to our hypotheses and suggest that VC financing is positively related with 
startups‟ trademarking activities.  
 
5.6.3 Robustness check 
 
We address first the issue of endogeneity, stemming from the fact that firms that trademarks 
could differ in unobservable ways from firms that do not trademark (such as in the quality of 
their underlying products and technologies), which lead then to a higher probability to receive 
VC funding. To control for the potential endogeneity issue, we use an instrumental variable 
approach. In order to find a suitable instrument for VC funding, we first recur to a variable 
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capturing the reputation of a firm, given that this is often positively associated with its 
economic outcomes which are valued by venture capitalists (Lange et al., 2011). Following 
previous studies, we construct a measure of reputation based on media coverage of the 
company in the press (Deephouse, 2000; Pollock and Rindova, 2003). More precisely, we 
capture reputation using the so-called coefficient of favorableness (Deephouse, 2000): 
Coefficient of favorableness =  
(f 2 − fu)/(total)2   if f > 𝑢
0                                  if f = u
(fu − u2)/(total)2  if u > 𝑓
  
 
where “f” is the stock of favorable news; “u” is the stock of unfavorable news; “total” is the 
stock of total news
4
. 
We first estimated a bivariate probit regression model, reported in Table 18, in order to 
validate our choice of instruments. The results reported in Table 18 show that reputation seems 
to positively influence VC funding, but it does not have a statistically significant association 
with trademarking. It also confirms that VC funding and trademarking are significantly related 
with each other.  
 
 
 
                                                     
4We used Lexis-Nexis in order to gather information on the coverage in the media of the new ventures included in 
our sample. We identified citations in the news in the UK newspapers. We coded an article as favorable if it praised 
the startup for its actions or involvement in some events that may increase its reputation, such as receiving award 
for its technology; we coded an article as unfavorable if it criticized the startup for its actions or involvement in 
some events that may decrease its reputation, such as massive layoffs; and we coded an article as neutral if there 
was no evaluations about the startup.  
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Table 18 Biprobit Regression 
  Markit Dumvct 
Dumexperience 
0.57** 0.52* 
(0.23) (0.29) 
Dumdr 
0.07 0.15 
(0.15) (0.18) 
Ageheterogeneity 
0.18 0.86** 
(0.35) (0.35) 
Age 
-0.02 0.05*** 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Coefficient of Favorableness 
0.18 0.54*** 
(0.14) (0.22) 
Constant 
-2.05*** -1.97*** 
(0.22) (0.33) 
Observations 1695 1695 
Rho 
0.19 
(0.09) 
Prob> chi2 0.04 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
We therefore use startup reputation as an instrumental variable to control for the 
endogeneity issue. Table 19 presents the results of our estimates based on the instrumental 
variable approach. They confirm the positive and statistically significant impact of VC funding 
on the trademarking propensity of startup firms. 
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Table 19 Instrumental Variable Estimation 
Dependent Variable Markit 
Dumvct 0.26***(0.09) 
Dumexperience -0.005(0.03) 
Dumdr 0.004(0.02) 
Ageheterogeneity -0.003**(0.04) 
Age 0.0007(0.005) 
Constant -0.06(0.06) 
Region Dummies YES 
Year Dummies YES 
N. observations 1695 
N. startups 178 
R2(overall) 0.02 
Prob> chi2 0.02 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Secondly, as discussed before, we also used a Poisson regression model as robustness 
check, to see whether the results related to the count dependent variables remain confirmed. 
Table 20 reports the results of the Poisson regression estimates, which are largely in line with 
the results emerging from the previously reported negative binomial model.  
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Table 20 Poisson Regression Results 
Dependent Variable Number of 
Trademarks ^ 
Breadth of Trademarks ° 
   
Dumvct 0.94***(0.24) 0.54**(0.24) 
Dumexperience 1.12**(0.55) 0.56(0.47) 
Dumdr 0.28(0.23) 0.18(0.19) 
Ageheterogeneity 1.05***(0.41) 0.85**(0.36) 
Age 0.03(0.07) 0.09(0.09) 
Constant -4.04***(1.06) -5.9***(1.31) 
Region Dummies YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES 
N. observations 1820 1820 
N. startups 178 178 
Log Likelihood -693.43 -894.05 
Prob> chi2 <0.01 <0.01 
Hausman test p value 0.73 0.99 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Standard errors in parentheses. ^ Random effects model. ° Random effects model. 
 
As for the effect of VC financing on the number of trademarks, the coefficient of dumvct is 
significant at 1% level. About the effect of VC financing on the breadth of trademarks, the 
effect of dumvct on the breadth of all trademarks remains significant as with the main 
regression results. Taken together, the results remain virtually unchanged when we use different 
models. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
 
Although the effect of VC on innovation has been extensively studied, most researchers depict 
innovation by patent data. Nevertheless, patent is a good proxy for the upstream side of 
innovative performance (the creation of inventions), but it is not good at capturing the 
downstream side of innovative performance (the commercialization of inventions). In contrast, 
trademark is more related with the commercialization side of innovation. In addition, the 
number of trademark applications from UK firms has nearly doubled that of patents 
(Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2012). Trademarking activity is thus can be used to complement our 
knowledge about the relationship between VC and innovation.  
In this chapter we have tried to evaluate the impact of VC on trademarking activities of 
startups. Our results provide strong evidence on the existence of a positive association between 
VC financing and startups‟ trademarking activities. More specifically, the logit model results 
provide support on the positive effect of VC funding on the likelihood of registering trademarks, 
and both the negative binomial model and Poisson model support a positive association of VC 
funding with the number of trademark applications and the breadth of trademarks.  
We thus contribute to the vast literature on the importance of venture capital funding for 
the growth of startups companies, complementing previous results using patent data. Using a 
complementary perspective on innovation activities by startup companies centred on trademark 
filings, and by that closer to the introduction into the market of novel products or services, we 
confirm the value-adding role of venture capitalists as catalysts for innovation related activity.  
We also contribute to the emerging literature on trademarking activity, highlighting a 
novel determinant of the startups‟ propensity to trademark, namely venture capital funding. 
This suggests the important role played by funding sources and external investors on the use of 
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different IPR mechanisms by companies (and new ventures in particular), an issue that deserves 
further inquiry by future research. 
The chapter also has some limitations which can be investigated by future researches. First, 
while using data from a single sector– micro and nanotechnology – ensures internal validity, 
caution should be applied in generalizing our results to other sectors, especially those low 
technology based sectors. Future research could thus extend the study by including also low 
technology based sectors.  
Second, we studied the impact of VC funding on trademarking activities of startup 
companies. However, we do not know the impact of amount of VC funds startups received on 
their subsequent trademarking activities. In addition, our results indicate that VC funding does 
have positive influence on trademarking activities, but we do not know the mechanism through 
which VC funding increases startup companies‟ trademarking activities, such as what activities 
they undertake or what type of support they actually provide in order to facilitate trademarking 
and innovation.
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6 Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter first gives a brief conclusion of the dissertation. In section 2 we discuss the 
limitation of the dissertation and provide some ideas on the future research avenues. Managerial 
and policy implications are discussed in the last section of this chapter.  
 
6.1 Conclusions 
Startups, especially technology based startups, are important in improving industry innovation 
and competition. However, due to their newness, information about their performance track 
record is limited. In addition, the market prospect of new technologies is uncertain. All these 
problems make startups confronting the problem of attracting funds. However, to some extent, 
venture capitalists can alleviate the problems due to their “scouting” and “coaching” role 
(Baum & Silverman, 2004). VC funding is one of the most optimal financial intermediaries for 
technology based startups. There is a wide literature on VC funding. We focus on two streams 
of VC studies in this dissertation. One is about the criteria used by venture capitalists to assess 
startups and the other is about the impact of VC on startups‟ innovation.  
In the literature, criteria related with the startup team, the product differentiation, the 
financial returns, the market attractiveness, and social ties have been considered important 
factors influencing venture capitalists‟ investment decisions (Petty & Gruber, 2011; Tyebjee & 
Bruno, 1984). Even though all these criteria are important, they are all correlated with one 
dimension of reputation, namely the attribute specific dimension, because they can lead to a 
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startup‟s being known for something (Lange et al., 2011). However, knowledge about effect of 
the other two dimensions of reputation (generalized visibility and generalized favorability) on 
VC funding is limited. We thus complete the picture by investigating the effect of the other two 
dimensions of reputation on VC funding. Our empirical results provide support on the positive 
effect of generalized visibility and generalized favorability on the likelihood of receiving VC 
funding. In addition, we also investigate the effect of top management team heterogeneity on 
VC funding. Management team is one of the most important factors considered by venture 
capitalists (MacMillan et al., 1985; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Muzyka et al., 1996). There are 
several studies having analyzed the relationship between management team heterogeneity and 
performance in the literature (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Laursen et al., 2004; Giuri et al., 2010), 
whereas knowledge about the role of management team heterogeneity in attracting VC funding 
is rare. Our empirical results support that management team heterogeneity has a positive impact 
on the likelihood of receiving VC funding.  
Thus, this empirical study has a threefold contribution to the literature. First, we analyze 
the effect of reputation on VC funding. We find startups‟ reputation is another important 
criterion used by venture capitalists. Second, we analyze the effect of team heterogeneity on VC 
funding. Our empirical results confirm its positive impact on VC funding. Third, we use media 
coverage to measure two different dimensions of reputation. The number of media coverage is 
used to measure generalized visibility dimension of reputation and the coefficient of 
favorableness is used to measure generalized favorability dimension of reputation. In the 
literature, most scholars use Fortune Magazine‟s reputation index to measure reputation (Bauer, 
2010; Highhouse et al., 2009a; Lange et al., 2011). Nevertheless, this approach has received 
several criticisms in the literature. For example, it is mostly linked with firms‟ previous 
financial performance, rarely about other aspects (Bauer, 2010; Brown & Perry, 1994b; Fryxell 
& Wang, 1994).  
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The second empirical study in this dissertation is about the effect of VC funding on 
startups‟ innovation. In the literature, innovation has been frequently captured by patent data 
(Bertoni et al., 2010; Kortum & Lerner, 1998; Kortum & Lerner, 2000). Patent counts are good 
to capture the creation of inventions. However, they are poorly in capturing the 
commercialization side of innovations (Millot, 2009). In contrast, trademarks are related with 
the firms‟ capability to bring promising ideas to market (Jensen & Webster, 2011; Mendonça et 
al., 2004). To better understand the effect of VC funding on innovation, we analyze the effect of 
VC funding on startups‟ trademarking activities. More specifically, we investigate the effect of 
VC funding on three aspects of trademarking activities: the likelihood of filing trademarks, the 
number of trademarks filed, and the breadth of trademarks filed.  
Our empirical results confirm the value adding role of VC funding on startups‟ innovative 
performance. VC funding positively influence all the three aspects of trademarking activities.  
Therefore, this study has at least twofold contributions to the literature. First, we analyze 
the effect of VC funding on trademarking activities, complementing the picture of the effect of 
VC funding on innovation in which the researches mainly resort to patent data to depict 
innovation. Our empirical results support the positive influence of VC funding on startup‟s 
trademarking activities. Second, we contribute to the trademarking literature by providing 
support that VC funding is an important determinant of startups‟ trademarking activity.  
 
6.2 Managerial implications 
 
The results of this dissertation have practical implications both on startup management and 
VC funding management.  
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Managerial implications for the startup management 
First, even though most startup entrepreneurs acknowledge that a reputation, especially a 
favorable reputation, plays an important role in future development, there is a failure to 
translate this notion into real actions (Goldberg, Cohen, & Fiegenbaum, 2003). In addition, 
firms differ in their relative success in building reputations (Highhouse et al., 2009). 
Considering that reputation is important in attracting capital, startup entrepreneurs should 
value reputation building in their daily management. Startup entrepreneurs could make some 
policies on reputation building. For example, if possible, they could distribute certain 
financial resources on special use in reputation building and assign certain employees to be 
responsible for reputation building activities. Moreover, we find media coverage is important 
in capturing a startup‟s reputation. Thus, promoting media visibility and media favorability 
are two important managerial implications for startup entrepreneurs. Startup entrepreneurs 
could improve media visibility by devoting certain resources on advertising, building good 
relationship with the media, and so on.  
Second, as we highlight, reputation is a multi-dimensional concept and has many 
dimensions, such as management capabilities, product quality, working environment, etc. 
Considering that startups are usually resource limited, startup entrepreneurs could make some 
strategic plans on the focus of certain specific reputation dimensions at different development 
stages. Our empirical results suggest that generalized favorability is the most important 
dimension of reputation influencing VC funding. However, generalized favorability is often 
accumulated through relative long-term efforts. Given that top management team 
heterogeneity also has positive contributions on receiving VC funding, in this situation, we 
suggest that startup entrepreneurs could start reputation building with enhancing top 
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management team heterogeneity, for example, when recruiting new directors, startup 
entrepreneurs could choose those who have different occupational backgrounds or in different 
age cohorts with incumbent ones.  
Third, since VC funding positively influence startups‟ trademarking activities which is 
often associated with their market performance, startup managers could consider VC funding 
as one of the optimal capital resources. Moreover, compared with other financial resources, 
except for capital support, venture capitalists also contribute to startups by providing 
managerial suggestions which is vital on startup development. Therefore, if to choose 
between VC funding and other financial resources, the positive effect of VC funding on their 
future innovation and performance should be one critical aspect considered by startup 
entrepreneurs.  
 
Managerial implications for VC managers 
Except for managerial implications for startup entrepreneurs, managerial instructions can also 
be drawn for VC managers. First, startup reputation should be another criterion used to 
evaluate startups and make investment decisions. Especially, in the early stage of evaluation, 
VC managers could resort to media to collect more information about startups and to solve 
the information asymmetry problem to some extent.  
Second, VC managers should manage their organizations toward building competences 
which are short in startups. Once making investment, VC firms‟ future is tightly related with 
investee companies‟ future. Startups often lack market strategic capabilities. Different with 
patenting which is related with the invention stage of innovation, trademarking is more related 
with the commercialization stage of innovation. Inventions could bring returns only when 
they are commercialized, even some patents have never been commercialized. Our empirical 
results indicate that VC funding has positive impact on startups‟ trademarking activities. In 
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order to help better startups on trademarking activities, VC managers should build capabilities 
about bringing inventions into market.  
 
Policy implications  
Our dissertation also has some policy implications for the government. New ventures are 
important in a country‟s economic growth. VC funding could enhance new ventures‟ 
innovation. Therefore, government can make some policies helping startups, especially those 
operating in nascent high-technology based sectors, to obtain VC funding. In addition, 
startups‟ reputation has positive influence on their likelihood of receiving VC funding. The 
government should also help startups to build favorable reputations. For example, the 
government could organize some training activities in order to help startup entrepreneurs to 
have a better understanding on the procedure of applying for VC funding, what criteria 
venture capitalists use to evaluate potential deals, the evaluation process of venture capitalists, 
and so on.  
Moreover, the government could act as an intermediary among VC managers, startup 
entrepreneurs and the media in order to facilitate their interactions. For example, they could 
create a platform to facilitate the communication between VC managers and startup 
entrepreneurs. Also, the government could organize some events making startups visible to 
the media or having opportunities to communicate with the media. The government even 
could organize some events and invite VC managers, startup entrepreneurs, and the media to 
participate so that they have chances to interact with each other.  
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6.3 Limitations and directions for future research  
 
Although we provide contributions to the literature, we acknowledge there are some limitations 
in this dissertation which can be further analyzed in the future.  
 
Limitations related with the empirical setting of the whole dissertation 
The first groups of limitations are associated with our empirical setting in this 
dissertation. First, even though MNT sector is an interesting setting to study our research 
questions, generalization of our results to other sectors should be careful. MNT is an emerging 
technology and its practical applications are not so perfectly understood, which is different 
with other mature technologies in the sense that emerging technologies may represent the 
future of a market and be more likely to obtain above-normal returns, thus are more likely to 
attract VC funding. That is, MNT sector may be a factor attracting venture capitalists‟ 
attention. As a consequence, the relationship between reputation and VC funding may be 
affected by the MNT sector. Therefore, future work may collect additional data from other 
sectors, especially mature technology related sectors, to do some cross-sector comparisons in 
order to have a more general understanding about the relationship between reputation and VC 
funding. Similar limitations can be said for the relationship between VC funding and 
trademarking. Startups operating in the MNT sector are high-technology based startups, 
which is different from low-technology based startups in that high-technology based startups 
are more likely to have inventions and thus more likely to have trademarking activities. This 
suggests that except for the factors we consider in this dissertation, MNT sector itself may be 
another factor influencing startups‟ trademarking activities. Thus, future work could rely on 
data from startups operating in low-technology based sectors to have a deeper knowledge 
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about the relationship between VC funding and innovation.  
The second limitation related with the empirical setting is that we only consider startups 
in this dissertation. Reputation is important not only for startups, but also for established large 
firms, considering that favorable reputation is often associated with higher performance and 
that to some extent, favorable reputation could reduce the possibility of engaging in 
opportunistic behaviors by investee companies because otherwise unfavorable news may be 
reported which may reduce their possibility to receive additional funds. Even though startups 
confront more funding problems compared with established large firms, large firms also have 
the fund problem. Reputation may be a factor influencing the likelihood of receiving funds for 
large firms. Future work could also investigate the relationship between reputation and VC 
funding for large firms, or even could compare the impact of reputation on startups and 
established large firms on receiving funds to look at whether the role of reputation is different.  
The third limitation related with the empirical setting is about the focus of one country, 
the United Kingdom. Since different countries have different institutional environments, 
especially concerns institutional environments on VC and trademarking, focusing on one 
single country ensures internal validity. On the other hand, different institutional 
environments make our results cannot be simply generated to other countries. For example, 
the scientific capability of the UK universities and institutions is in a well-known position in 
the world, which can provide R&D support for high-technology based firms and thus 
contribute to their innovations.  
 
Limitations related with the empirical study on the effect of reputation on VC Funding 
The second group of limitations is related with the first empirical study. First, we 
investigate the effect of team occupational background heterogeneity and team age 
heterogeneity on the likelihood of receiving VC funding. However, except for these two aspects 
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of team heterogeneity, there are several other aspects such as team industry experience, tenure, 
race, gender, etc. For example, directors having same race or gender are likely to categorize 
them into one group, which may facilitate affiliation among them but may also provoke 
intragroup hostility (Jehn et al., 1999). Which side of effects has dominant influence on 
receving funds? Team occupational background heterogeneity is more directly related with 
team capability. Age is more related with a person‟s value and perspectives, which may 
indirectly influence team creativity (Simons et al., 1999). Race or gender is even less 
job-related than age. Do job-related dimensions of team heterogeneity have more influences 
on receiving funds? Future research could analyze other dimensions of team heterogeneity and 
compare their different effects on receiving funds.  
We analyze the effect of reputation on the likelihood of receiving VC funding. However, 
we have no idea where reputation comes from for startups. Stakeholders could construct 
reputations for a large established firm from many signals, such as market and accounting 
signals, institutional signals (for instance, institutional ownership, firm size, etc), strategy 
signals (for instance, differentiation, diversification, etc) (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). 
However, due to limited performance track record and limited resources that can be devoted 
to building reputation, the antecedents of reputation for startups should be quite different from 
established large firms. However, each startup has an initial reputation (Mahon & Wartick, 
2003). The antecedent of reputation for startups is thus a critical issue for future research. 
Moreover, knowledge about the antecedents of reputation could help us in understanding how 
to build reputation and how reputation develops. There are some studies having analyzed how 
to build reputation. For example, Highhouse et al. (2009b) provide a conceptual framework of 
the formation of corporate reputation. Goldberg et al. (2003) propose four strategies for 
reputation building: dynamic exploitation of existing assets, development of core 
competencies, image management, and strategic alliances, but they investigate the effect of 
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the strategies on reputation resorting to field research on three software companies in Israel 
during the years 1997-1998. Nevertheless, the research on startups using quantitative research 
method is rare. Therefore, more empirical search in this area is called.  
 
Limitations related with the empirical study on the effect of VC on trademarking 
The third group of limitations is related with the second empirical study. First, in the 
second empirical study, even though our empirical results confirm the positive influence of VC 
funding on trademarking activities, we do not analyze what actions venture capitalists 
undertake in facilitating startups‟ trademarking activities. Many actions related with VC 
funding may stimulate trademarking activities, for instance, supplying enough funds, 
providing managerial suggestions especially suggestions on product commercialization, 
adopting tight monitoring, and so on. Which activity has more contributions on trademarking 
activities? Future research could compare the impacts of different actions venture capitalists 
adopt and find the actual actions which have more contributions on startups‟ trademarking 
activities.  
Second, we investigate the influence of VC funding on trademarking for startups in three 
aspects: the likelihood of having trademarks, the number of trademarks registered, and the 
breadth of trademarks registered. Sandner & Block (2011) provide four indicators to measure 
trademark value: Nice classes of a trademark, seniorities claimed, oppositions brought by an 
applicant, and oppositions received by a trademark application. We just consider one indicator 
of trademark value in this dissertation, namely, Nice classes of trademarks. Based on the four 
measures, future research could analyze the effect of VC funding on the quality of trademarks 
registered along all the four indicators. Normally, the four indicators are positively related 
with a trademark‟s value. Moreover, trademark is often positively associated with consumers‟ 
purchasing decision, which may improve firms‟ sells. Trademarks also positively influence 
 118 
 
companies‟ market valuations (Sandner & Block, 2011). We provide support that VC funding 
is an important factor on new ventures to create trademarks. However, except for VC funding, 
are there any other factors influence trademarking activities? This is another issue which 
could be investigated in future.   
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